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JUDICIALLY MODIFIED DEMOCRACY: 
COURT AND STATE PRE-EMPTION OF LOCAL 
GMO REGULATION IN HAWAII AND BEYOND 
RITA BARNETT-ROSE† 
INTRODUCTION 
The federal framework for regulating genetically modified 
organisms (GMOs) has long been criticized as fragmented and 
inadequate to protect against various health, environmental, and 
economic concerns.1  Yet, despite having the legal authority to 
augment the federal framework, the overwhelming majority of states 
have failed to enact any substantive legislation governing GMOs at 
the state level.2  In the wake of this regulatory vacuum, a small but 
growing number of local governments have attempted to regulate 
GMOs locally.3  However, local GMO regulations face significant 
challenges by the GMO industry, which has sought to undo local 
regulatory authority both through the courts and through industry 
lobbying of state legislators to expressly pre-empt local regulation.4  
Today, roughly seventeen states have now expressly pre-empted local 
authority to regulate GMOs, largely due to industry influence.  
  Hawaii is a “high-stakes battleground” in the genetically 
modified debate.5  In addition to being the world’s top producer of 
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 1.  See discussion infra pt. II.A. 
 2.  See discussion infra pt. II.B. 
 3.  See, e.g., Geri Edens & Peter Whitfield, BakerHostetler, The State and Local 
Regulatory Landscape for Bioengineered Plants, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW STRATEGY (Oct. 31, 
2014), http://www.environmentallawstrategy.com/2014/10/the-state-and-local-regulatory-
landscape-for-bioengineered-plants/  (providing examples of local laws and ordinances enacted 
to regulate cultivation, use, and labeling of GMOs); see also discussion infra pt. II.C and III. 
 4.  See Matthew Porter, State Pre-emption Law: The Battle for Local Control of 
Democracy, 33 PESTICIDES & YOU 13, 15 (2013); see also discussion infra pt. II.C. 
 5.  Heather Hosmer,  Outgrowing Agency Oversight: Genetically Modified Crops and the 
Regulatory Commons Theory, 25 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 647, 648 (2013); see also Daylin-
Rose Gibson, Remembering the “Big Five”: Hawai’i’s Constitutional Obligation to Regulate the 
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genetically-modified seed corn, Hawaii has had more outdoor field 
tests of GMOs than any other state in the nation.6  Due to its small 
size, field tests are also located closer to residential areas than any 
other state.7 While some local citizens have welcomed the agricultural 
biotech industry and its significant contribution to state revenue, 
others have opposed GMO cultivation and testing on health, 
environmental, and economic grounds.8  Because Hawaii does not 
expressly pre-empt local GMO regulation, those opposing GMO 
cultivation and testing believe that Hawaiian counties have a legal 
right to address GMO concerns locally.9  In 2013-2014, three local 
counties – Hawaii County, Kauai County, and Maui County – all 
attempted to place certain restrictions on the growing of GMOs.10  
Generally, these local efforts sought to: (1) impose greater 
notification and disclosure requirements regarding GMO production 
and restricted pesticide use; (3) establish sufficient buffer zones to 
protect residential areas from the hazards of pesticide drift; (3) 
require adequate public health and environmental impact studies 
prior to further GMO testing and cultivation; and/or (4) restrict GMO 
testing and cultivation to contained areas, such as greenhouses, to 
protect non-genetically modified food crops from transgenic 
contamination.11 
Nevertheless, despite the counties’ conservation obligations 
under the Hawaii Constitution and broad statutory authority to 
regulate in order to protect local health, life, and property, all three 
 
Genetic Engineering Industry, 15 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL’Y J. 213, 216 (2014) (“The Genetically 
Modified Organism . . . debate [in Hawaii] has become so contentious that there is little room 
for productive conversation.”); Amici Curiae Center for Food Safety, et al.’s Memorandum in 
Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment on Counts One and Two of Plaintiffs’ 
Complaint at *9,  Haw. Floriculture & Nursery Ass’n v. Cty. of Haw., No. 00267-BMK, 2014 WL 
5359758  (D.  Haw. Sept. 18, 2014) (“Hawai’i has been the epicenter of controversial GE 
organism commercial development for nearly two decades, and its lawfulness has been the 
subject of litigation in this Court going back more than a decade.”). 
 6.  Gibson, supra note 5, at 214–15, 231–32; see also HAWAI’I CENTER FOR FOOD SAFETY, 
PESTICIDES IN PARADISE: HAWAI’I’S HEALTH & ENVIRONMENT AT RISK, at 5 (2015), available 
at http://www.centerforfoodsafety.org/reports/3901/pesticides-in-paradise-hawaiis-health-and-
environment-at-risk (“Hawai’i leads the nation in GE crop field trials, with tests on 1,141 sites in 
2014 alone, representing a far higher density of field tests than on larger mainland states . . . .”) 
[hereinafter HAWAII REPORT]. 
 7.  HAWAII REPORT, supra note 6, at 22–23. 
 8.  See Gibson, supra note 5, at 215 (“Many residents oppose the [genetic engineering] 
industry’s presence in Hawaii . . . .”); discussion infra pt. III. 
 9.  HAWAII REPORT, supra note 6, at 31–32. 
 10.  See discussion infra pt. III. 
 11.  See discussion infra pt. III. 
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local ordinances were immediately challenged by the GMO industry 
and swiftly invalidated by the federal district court of Hawaii on state 
and federal pre-emption grounds.12  The Hawaii pre-emption 
decisions were the first in the country to invalidate local GMO 
regulations on implied and express pre-emption grounds.13  If 
permitted to stand, the decisions will likely have a significant adverse 
impact on the ability of other local governments throughout the U.S. 
to regulate GMOs locally.14  If they stand, the decisions will also be 
another devastating blow to local governments’ “home rule” 
authority to regulate on issues of significant local concern.15 
This article argues that state and federal pre-emption of the 
Kauai County, Hawaii County, and Maui County GMO ordinances 
was not justified by existing federal and Hawaii state law.16  It further 
argues that in the absence of comprehensive regulatory schemes 
sufficient to address local health, environmental, and economic 
concerns, courts and states should refrain from denying authority to 
regulate GMOs at the local level. Permitting local regulation of 
GMOs will not only support legitimate democracy on an issue of 
significant impact to local communities, but it may also prove to be 
exactly what is needed to find innovative solutions to acknowledged 
GMO risks and realities. 
Part I of this article briefly describes the general health, 
environmental, and economic concerns surrounding the field-testing, 
 
 12.  See Robert Ito Farm, Inc. v. Cty. of Maui, No. 14-00511 SOM/BMK, 2015 WL 4041480, 
at *12 (D. Haw. June 30, 2015) (holding that a Maui ban on genetically engineered organisms 
permitted by federal regulation is expressly pre-empted by federal law and impliedly preempted 
by state law); Haw. Floriculture & Nursery Ass’n v. Cty. of Haw., No. 14-00267 BMK, 2014 WL 
6685817, at *9 (D. Haw. Nov. 26, 2014) (holding that a county ban on the dissemination of 
genetically engineered plants that are regulated by the Secretary of Agriculture is expressly pre-
empted by federal law and impliedly preempted by state law); Syngenta Seeds, Inc. v. Cty. of 
Kauai, No. 14-00014 BMK, 2014 WL 4216022, at *9 (D. Haw. Aug. 25, 2014) (holding that a 
local ordinance imposing reporting requirements on GMOs was impliedly pre-empted by state 
law). 
 13.  Peter Whitfield, Baker Hostetler Maui GMO Ban Overturned; Federal Court Remains 
Consistent on Pre-emption Analysis, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW STRATEGY (July 2, 2015), 
http://www.environmentallawstrategy.com/2015/07/maui-gmo-ban-overturned-federal-court-
remains-consistent-on-pre-emption-analysis/. 
 14.  See Peter Whitfield, Baker Hostetler Federal District Court Doubles Down, Vacates 
Hawaii County GMO Ban, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW STRATEGY (Dec. 4, 2014), 
http://www.environmentallawstrategy.com/2014/12/federal-district-court-doubles-down-vacates-
hawaii-county-gmo-ban/ (discussing the Hawaii county case and similar laws that may be 
impacted by pre-emption rulings) [hereinafter Whitfield, Court Doubles Down]. 
 15.  See discussion infra pt. V. 
 16.  See discussion infra pt. IV. 
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cultivation, and release of GMOs into the environment and food 
supply.  Part II reviews the current federal framework regulating 
GMOs, and assesses the legal authority of states and local 
governments to enact their own regulations.  Part III addresses the 
local concerns about GMO field-testing and cultivation in Hawaii in 
particular, and thereafter focuses on the efforts by Kauai County, 
Hawaii County, and Maui County to regulate GMOs locally.  Part IV 
argues that the Hawaii district court’s determinations of state and 
federal pre-emption of the local GMO ordinances were not supported 
by existing state and federal law.  Part V explains why courts and 
states should allow local regulation of GMOs, both to foster 
innovative solutions to legitimate GMO concerns and enable local 
democracy. 
I. HEALTH, ENVIRONMENTAL, AND ECONOMIC RISKS OF GMOS 
Genetic modification (GM) or genetic engineering (GE) involves 
the splicing of foreign genes from one organism into the genes of 
another to generate new traits in the host organism.17  With genetic 
modification, DNA combinations that are not possible in nature can 
be developed.18  Foreign genes are introduced into a host organism in 
a number of ways, including (a) particle gun blasting of tiny particles 
of alien DNA into the host cells; (b) infecting the host with a 
bacterium modified to carry the donor into the host cells; (c) 
microinjecting the DNA into plant cells directly; and (d) chemical or 
electrical treatments designed to trigger the host’s direct intake of 
foreign DNA.19  In all cases, the original plant/organism is forced to 
adapt to alien genes inserted into its DNA structure.20 
 
 17.  See Thomas O. McGarity, Seeds of Distrust: Federal Regulation of Genetically Modified 
Foods, 35 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 403, 406–07 (2002) (describing technology used to introduce 
genes from one organism into another for genetic modification). The terms “genetically 
modified,” “genetically engineered,” “GM,” “GMO,” and “agricultural biotechnology” will all 
be used in this article to refer to crops or plants that have genetic characteristics not normally 
occurring in nature and introduced through human intervention. 
 18.  See, e.g., Gibson, supra note 5, at 218–19 (noting that genetic engineering could include 
creating: “tomatoes with fish genes, potatoes with mouse genes, apples with chicken genes, and 
even pigs with human genes.”). 
 19.  McGarity, supra note 17, at 406; see also NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, GENETICALLY 
MODIFIED PEST-PROTECTED PLANTS: SCIENCE AND REGULATION, 24–25 (2000) (discussing 
emergence of different methods of introducing foreign genes into an organism). 
 20.  See Debra M. Strauss, Defying Nature: The Ethical Implications of Genetically 
Modified Plants, 3 J. FOOD L. & POL’Y 1, 2 (2007) (“Genetically Modified Organisms . . . are 
created when the genes of one organism are inserted into the DNA of another organism, 
causing the target trait to be expressed in that non-related species.”). 
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The end-products of genetic modification are essentially 
characterized as falling into one of three generations.21  The first 
generation of GM products is primarily focused on single-gene, 
single-trait modification of the host organism, such as insect 
resistance, pest resistance, or virus resistance in food crop plants.22  
The second generation of genetic modification is focused on efforts to 
improve output features of the host organism, such as improved 
nutritional value, faster growth of plants or animals, or crops designed 
to withstand heat or drought.23  The third generation of genetic 
modification extends beyond GM food crops into the world of 
biopharming, where GM plants, animals, or microorganisms are 
engineered so that they might produce pharmaceuticals, remediate 
environmental hazards, or even produce organs for human 
transplant.24 
Although biotechnology has enormous potential for good, critics 
have raised a number of legitimate health, environmental, and 
economic concerns.25 
A. Potential Health Impacts of GM Food Consumption 
Originally touted as a way to make foods better-tasting, longer-
lasting, and more nutritious, the majority of GM crops grown 
commercially for food today only have one or both of two alien traits: 
the plant is either made to be herbicide-resistant or insect-resistant.26 
 
 21.  Maria R. Lee-Muramoto, Reforming the “Uncoordinated” Framework for Regulation 
of Biotechnology, 17 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 311, 350 (2012). 
 22.  Id. 
 23.  See id. at 351 (providing examples of technological advances in agriculture through 
genetic modification). 
 24.  Id. at 351–52. 
 25.  See generally McGarity, supra note 17 (evaluating federal regulations designed to 
protect public from health risks posed by genetically modified foods); Muramoto, supra note 21 
(proposing legislative reform of the regulatory system for agricultural biotechnology in the 
United States); see also STEVEN M. DRUKER, ALTERED GENES, TWISTED TRUTH: HOW THE 
VENTURE TO GENETICALLY ENGINEER OUR FOOD HAS SUBVERTED SCIENCE, CORRUPTED 
GOVERNMENT, AND SYSTEMATICALLY DECEIVED THE PUBLIC 1–7 (2015) (describing the 
development of a lawsuit against the FDA filed in objection to FDA policy on genetically 
modified foods). 
 26.  See INSTITUTE FOR RESPONSIBLE TECHNOLOGY, STATE OF THE SCIENCE ON THE 
HEALTH RISKS OF GM FOODS 1 (Jan. 24, 2013), available at http://responsibletechnology.org/ 
State-of-Science-Health-Risks.pdf [hereinafter IRT REPORT] (describing initial claims that 
genetic engineering would resolve hunger problems but observing that “the only two traits that 
are found in nearly all commercialized GM plants are herbicide tolerance and/or pesticide 
production.”); see also Gibson, supra note 5, at 221 (“Two traits dominate the crop varieties that 
have succeeded on the market thus far: herbicide tolerance and insect resistance.”).  In addition 
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Herbicide-resistant GMOs are designed to survive direct 
application of certain herbicides that would otherwise kill them.27 
Because of the enormous amount of herbicides used to test and grow 
herbicide-resistant GM crops, one of the primary human health 
concerns is the increased use and consumption of pesticides.28  Indeed, 
despite claims that the use of GM crops would reduce pesticide usage 
overall, since 2010, pesticide usage in the United States has increased 
by more than 500 million pounds.29  Adding to the concern is the fact 
that  glyphosate, the herbicide most frequently used on GM crops and 
originally touted as non-toxic, was recently found to be a probable 
human carcinogen by the World Health Organization.30  
Insect-resistant GMOs contain a gene from the soil bacterium 
Bacillus thuringiensis (Bt) that produces a protein toxic to certain 
known crop pests.31  While insect-resistant GM crops have been found 
to decrease the overall use of sprayed pesticides, the amount of toxins 
now incorporated within the plants themselves is far greater than the 
 
to insect and herbicide resistance, approximately 1% of current GE food crops in the United 
States are engineered to be virus resistant, such as the GE Hawaiian Papaya, and certain 
zucchini and crook neck squash.  Gibson, supra note 5, at 221. 
 27.  HAWAII REPORT, supra note 6 at 21–22; IRT REPORT, supra note 26, at 1. 
 28.  See, e.g., McGarity, supra note 17, at 417–18.  Note that this article uses the word 
“pesticides” to refer to both insecticides (bug killers) and herbicides (weed killers) collectively. 
 29.  RAMON J. SEIDLER, PESTICIDE USE ON GENETICALLY ENGINEERED CROPS 3 (Sept. 
2014), available at http://static.ewg.org/agmag/pdfs/pesticide_use_on_genetically_ 
engineered_crops.pdf (noting that the USDA itself has indicated that “since 1996, glyphosate 
use has increased some 12-fold during the GE crop era, with overall herbicide usage increasing 
by more than 500 million pounds.”); see also, IRT REPORT, supra note 26, at 3–4 (describing 
steady increase in herbicide usage between 1996 and 2011). 
 30.  Daniel Cressey, Widely Used Herbicide Linked to Cancer, SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN, 
(Mar. 25, 2015), available at http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/widely-used-herbicide-
linked-to-cancer/. Glyphosate has also been linked to a number of other significant health 
issues.  See, e.g., Michael Antoniou et al., Roundup and Birth Defects: Is the Public Being Left in 
the Dark?, EARTH OPEN SOURCE (June 2011), http://earthopensource.org/wp-
content/uploads/RoundupandBirthDefectsv5.pdf (discussing various glyphosate studies 
suggesting serious risks of human health harm); Leah Schinasi & Maria Leon, Non-Hodgkin 
Lymphoma and Occupational Exposure to Agricultural Pesticide Chemical Groups and Active 
Ingredients: A Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis, 11 INT’L J. ENVTL. RES. PUB. HEALTH 
4449 (2014) (analyzing studies which suggest a link between an increase in non-Hodgkins 
lymphoma and pesticide use); see generally Anthony Samsel & Stephanie Seneff, Glyphosate, 
Pathways to Modern Diseases III: Manganese, Neurological Diseases, and Associated 
Pathologies, 6 SURG. NEUROL. INT’L 45 (2015) (investigating a link between Roundup pesticide 
and manganese deficiency which may lead to more serious health problems). 
 31.  JORGE FERNANDEZ-CORNEJO ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC. ECON. RESEARCH 
SERV., GENETICALLY ENGINEERED CROPS IN THE UNITED STATES 1 (Feb. 2014), available at 
http://www.ers.usda.gov/media/1282246/err162.pdf [hereinafter USDA REPORT]. 
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amount of the displaced spray.32  This means that humans consuming 
insect-resistant GM crops are likely ingesting more pesticides than 
before genetic modification, since the spray residue can presumably 
be washed off prior to consumption, while a pesticide built into crops 
cannot.33 
Despite these concerns about increased pesticide consumption, 
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the agency charged 
with setting the pesticide tolerance limits in foods, has elected to 
increase the tolerance levels for glyphosate in foods in order to 
accommodate the known levels found in herbicide-resistant GM 
crops.34  The EPA has also elected not to set any tolerance level for 
insect-resistant GM crops containing the Bt toxin.35 
Beyond pesticides, GM crops and foods themselves also present 
a number of allergenicity and toxicity concerns.36  Allergic reactions 
can be triggered by the insertion of foreign genes from a source not 
typically consumed by humans or by the insertion of foreign genes 
from a known allergen into a food crop that is not known to be 
allergenic.37 Insertion of foreign genes might also add new toxins to a 
formerly safe food crop or increase the level of existing toxins beyond 
levels considered safe for human consumption.38 
 
 
 32.  IRT REPORT, supra note 26, at 4; see generally Angelika Hilbeck et al., No Scientific 
Consensus on GMO Safety, 27 ENVTL. SCI. EUR.  1 (2015) (discussing a lack of conclusive 
evidence regarding the safety of genetically modified foods in the human diet). 
 33.  See McGarity, supra note 17 (“Unlike Bt microorganisms, which rapidly break down in 
the environment, human consumption of the Bt toxin in GM plants is virtually assured.”). 
 34.  BRIAN TOKAR, INST. FOR SOC. ECOLOGY BIOTECHNOLOGY PROJECT, DEFICIENCIES 
IN FEDERAL REGULATORY OVERSIGHT OF GENETICALLY ENGINEERED CROPS, at *6 (2006), 
available at http://environmentalcommons.org/RegulatoryDeficiencies.html; see also Krystle B. 
Blanchard, The Hazards of GMOs: Scientific Reasons Why They Should Be Regulated, Political 
Reasons Why They Are Not, and Legal Answers to What Should Be Done, 27 REGENT U. L. 
REV. 133, 140 (2014) (“[T]he EPA recently increased the legal limit for glyphosate in 
corn . . . .”). 
 35.  See TOKAR, supra note 34, at 6 (“Meanwhile, the EPA  has used its authority under 
the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act to exempt the pesticides currently produced by GE 
plants from any limit on human exposure.”); Blanchard, supra note 34, at 140 (“B.t.’s natural 
occurrence is one reason the FDA presumes both that there can be no material difference 
between GM plants and natural plants and that this GM technology is safe; thus, the FDA 
requires no independent studies of the effects of the B.t. bacterium when used by GM 
technologies.”). 
 36.  IRT REPORT, supra note 26, at 3–10; Emily Montgomery, Genetically Modified Plants 
and Regulatory Loopholes and Weaknesses Under the Plant Protection Act, 37 VT. L. REV. 351, 
357 (2012). 
 37.  Montgomery, supra note 36, at 357. 
 38.  Id. 
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While GM proponents often minimize these human health 
concerns, in nearly every independent animal consumption study, 
GMOs have been found to be materially different from their non-
GMO counterparts.39  A number of these studies have found that 
animals consuming GM foods experienced: (1) toxic reactions in their 
digestive tracts; (2) liver and organ damage; (3) higher death rates; (4) 
allergic responses; (5) reproductive failures; and (6) greater infant 
mortality.40  Although not necessarily dispositive as to human health, 
adverse animal studies do raise legitimate concerns about similar 
allergic or toxic effects in humans.41  There also appears to be at least 
some evidence suggesting that these concerns are justified.42  For 
example, soon after GM soy was introduced into the U.K. market, 
researchers reported that allergies to soy had “skyrocketed by fifty 
percent in a single year.”43  Other scientists have suggested a link 
between the dramatic rise in celiac disease in North America and 
Europe with the dramatic increase in human exposure to glyphosate.44  
In another study, GM corn containing Bt toxin was exposed to human 
cells, causing fluid to leak through the cell walls, and leading the 
researchers to conclude that “modified Bt toxins [from GM plants] 
are not inert on human cells, but can exert toxicity.”45 
Despite evidence and preliminary research suggesting legitimate 
toxicity and allergenicity concerns, it is nearly impossible to 
determine the true extent to which GMOs are contributing adversely 
to human health.46  This is exacerbated by Food and Drug 
 
 39.  See generally IRT REPORT, supra note 26 (describing various studies on animal 
consumption of genetically altered foods and noting that “[n]early every independent animal 
feeding safety study shows adverse or unexplained effects.”); see also JOHN FAGAN, MICHAEL 
ANTONIOU & CLAIRE ROBINSON, GMO MYTHS AND TRUTHS 127–44 (2014), available at 
http://earthopensource.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/GMO-Myths-and-Truths-edition2.pdf. 
 40.  IRT REPORT, supra note 26, at 3–10; see generally Gilles-Eric Serallini et al., 
Republished study: long-term toxicity of a Roundup herbicide and a Roundup-tolerant genetically 
modified maize, 26 ENVTL. SCI. EUR. 14 (2014) (liver and kidney damage in rats); FAGAN, 
ANTONIOU & ROBINSON, supra note 39, at 147–57. 
 41.  See IRT REPORT, supra note 26, at 10. 
 42.  See id. 
 43.  Id. at 8. 
 44.  See generally Anthony Samsel & Stephanie Seneff, Glyphosate, Pathways To Modern 
Diseases II: Celiac Sprue and Gluten Intolerance, 6 INTERDISP. TOXICOL. 159 (2013). 
 45.  IRT REPORT, supra note 26, at *9. Other studies have indicated that Bt toxin is not 
fully destroyed in the human stomach during digestion, and that a section of its amino acid 
sequence is identical to a known allergen (egg yolk). Id.; see also Blanchard, supra note 34, at 
139–40 (describing health effects observed in humans exposed to Bt). 
 46.  See IRT REPORT, supra note 26, at 3–4 (stating that the unpredictability of genetic 
mutations in genetically altered foods can lead to unforeseen effects on health). 
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Administration (FDA) regulatory policy, which leaves all GM food 
safety testing in the hands of the GMO producers themselves, 
providing little incentive for the GMO industry to conduct any 
legitimate long-term human health studies.47  Independent human 
health research is also scarce, primarily due to the lack of available 
funding for independent studies and independent researchers’ 
difficulty gaining access to the genetic materials used by the biotech 
industry.48  In addition, again due to FDA policy, GM producers are 
neither required to disclose to the public when new GMO food 
products are placed into the market, nor to label them accordingly.49  
Thus, “[i]f a consumer becomes ill, it is impossible for him to connect 
his symptoms to specific GE foods in order to report the suspected 
impact to a health care provider.”50 
However, even without definitive evidence of human health 
harm, there remains enormous disagreement in the relevant scientific 
community worldwide over whether GMOs are safe for 
consumption.51  Specifically, although GMO proponents often claim a 
“scientific consensus” over GM food safety, a recent statement 
published in the scientific journal Environmental Sciences Europe, 
and signed by over 300 scientists with relevant expertise, strongly 
refutes this claim, declaring it an “artificial construct” created by an 
“internal circle of stakeholders.”52  The statement further asserts that 
any claim to scientific consensus not only “misrepresents or outright 
ignores the currently available scientific evidence,” but also 
“encourages a climate of complacency that could lead to a lack of 
regulatory and scientific rigour and appropriate caution, potentially 
 
 47.  DRUKER, supra note 25, at 130 (“The industry’s priority was to get the new products 
marketed as quickly as possible, not to minimize the attendant risks . . .”); FAGAN, ANTONIOU 
& ROBINSON, supra note 39, at 89. 
 48.  FAGAN, ANTONIOU & ROBINSON, supra note 39, at 89; Hilbeck, supra note 32, at 1 
(noting that independent researchers wanting access to industry GE materials have been denied 
access unless willing to sign contractual agreements with the GMO developers, which would 
confer unacceptable control over publication of the results); Muramoto, supra note 21, at 325 
(noting public statement to the EPA by 26 scientists complaining that Monsanto and other GE 
companies were restricting them from engaging in independent research by using restrictive 
technology agreements that would require company approval of the research and results). 
 49.  Muramoto supra note 21, at 321. 
 50.  Id. at 328. 
 51.  Hilbeck, supra note 32, at 1–2. 
 52.  Id.; but see Commonly Asked Questions about the Food Safety of GMOs, 
MONSANTO.COM, http://www.monsanto.com/newsviews/pages/food-safety.aspx (claiming that 
“governmental regulatory agencies, scientific organizations, and leading health associations 
worldwide agree that food grown from GM crops is safe to eat.”) (last visited Sept. 6, 2015). 
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endangering the health of humans, animals, and the environment.”53 
Given the proliferation of GMOs in the American food supply 
over the last three decades, the continuing lack of scientific consensus 
on GMO safety is alarming.54  Today, more than ninety percent of all 
U.S. produced corn and ninety-three percent of U.S. produced soy is 
genetically engineered.55  The result of this takeover of two major 
U.S. crops is that nearly every processed food within the United 
States contains GM materials, although the majority of U.S. 
consumers are largely unaware of this fact.56 
Consumer ignorance of (and lack of informed consent to) GMO 
consumption is also primarily due to the FDA’s unwillingness to 
require GMO producers to notify the FDA whenever new GM foods 
are put into the market, or to require them to label GM foods 
accordingly.57  Yet, this lack of GMO disclosure has led to consumer 
confusion, activist anger, and a growing mistrust over the 
government’s purported interest in putting consumer health and 
environmental safety before biotech industry advancement.58 
 
 53.  Hilbeck, supra note 32, at 2. 
 54.  See, e.g., DRUKER, supra note 25, at 165 (noting that over 90% of processed food today 
contains genetically modified organisms).  The very first genetically engineered food introduced 
into the U.S. market was the Flavr Savr tomato in 1994, released despite significant scientific 
controversy over its safety. Id. at 269–83. 
 55.  Debra M. Strauss, The Role of Courts, Agencies, and Congress in GMO’s: A 
Multilateral Approach to Ensuring the Safety of the Food Supply, 48 IDAHO L. REV. 267, 269 
(2012); USDA REPORT, supra note 31, at 9–10. 
 56.  See USDA REPORT, supra note 31, at 2 (“U.S. consumers eat many products derived 
from these crops—including cornmeal, oils, and sugars—largely unaware of their GE origins.”). 
 57.  See Tara B. Ratanun, Genetically Modified Organisms and Environmental Justice: 
Should Labeling Be Mandatory on Products Containing Genetically Engineered Ingredients?, 42 
W. ST. L. REV. 111, 122 (2014) (“[A] vast majority of U.S. citizens support GM food ingredient 
labeling . . . [but] there has been no proposal by the FDA to establish labeling regulations.”) 
(citation omitted); Strauss, Defying Nature, supra note 20, at 19 (“[G]enetically altered foods 
are not labeled, segregated, or monitored in the United States.”). Meanwhile, the biotech 
industry has lobbied quite successfully to prevent any GMO labeling requirements at the state 
or local level. See generally Ross H. Pifer, Mandatory Labeling Laws: What Do Recent State 
Enactments Portend for the Future of GMOs?, 118 PENN. ST. L. REV. 789, 799–806 (2014). 
 58.  See Blanchard, supra note 34, at 133–34 (discussing efforts to impose labeling 
requirements on genetically modified foods and resistance to those efforts). The impetus for 
industry opposition to mandatory labeling appears clear: recent polls indicate that over 55% of 
U.S. consumers say they would avoid consuming GM foods altogether if aware that the food 
was genetically modified. Strauss, The Role of Courts, supra note 55, at 270; see Allison Kopicki, 
Strong Support for Labeling Modified Foods, N.Y. TIMES (July 27, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/28/science/strong-support-for-labeling-modified-
foods.html?_r=0; see also Morgan Anderson Helme, Genetically Modified Food Fight: The FDA 
Should Step Up to the Regulatory Plate so States Do Not Cross the Constitutional Line, 98 MINN. 
L. REV. 356, 374 (2013) (indicating that once GM labeling became mandatory in EU and Japan, 
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B. Environmental and Economic Risks of GMO Cultivation 
Beyond the potential health risks of GMO consumption, the 
field-testing and cultivation of GM crops also raises significant 
environmental and economic concerns. 
First, the overuse of glyphosate and the presence of Bt toxin in 
every cell of insect-resistant GM crop plants has resulted in the 
creation of “superweeds” and “superbugs” – weeds and insects that 
are particularly difficult to control because they are resistant to 
glyphosate and Bt toxin.59  Surveys have indicated that at least twenty-
four species of superweeds are now resistant to glyphosate, and as of 
2012, over “14 million acres of cotton, soybean, and corn have already 
been invaded by resistant weeds.”60  That number is expected to 
double by 2015.61 Unfortunately, the biotech industry has responded 
to the emergence of superweeds and superbugs by engineering crops 
“stacked” with additional foreign traits designed to resist even more 
toxic pesticides.62  This creates the potential for additional superweeds 
and superbugs that will also eventually need to be addressed by even 
deadlier pesticides, creating what many GMO critics have termed the 
“chemical treadmill.”63  In addition to the increased pesticide 
spraying, GM growers have also resorted to using systemic 
insecticides to fight off resistant crop pests.64 Systemic insecticides, 
which coat the entire GM seed so that the insecticide is subsequently 
expressed throughout the entire GM plant, are believed to be largely 
responsible for the collapse of bee colonies and the deaths of other 
non-target species.65 
Beyond damage to the environment and non-target species by 
the increased pesticide applications, GM crops can also become 
superweeds themselves, eventually overtaking less biologically-
advantaged versions of their own species.66  GM crops may also 
contaminate non-GM crops through gene drift and cross-pollination, 
 
GM products virtually disappeared). 
 59.  USDA REPORT, supra note 31, 31–33; Muramoto, supra note 21, at 325–26. 
 60.  Muramoto, supra note 21, at 326. 
 61.  Id. 
 62.  Seidler, supra note 29, at 2–3; Muramoto, supra note 21, at 326–27. These more toxic 
pesticides include Dicamba, and 2,4-D, a pesticide used in the Vietnam-era chemical cocktail 
known as Agent Orange. Muramoto, supra note 21, at 326–27. 
 63.  Seidler, supra note 29, at 2–3; FAGAN, ANTONIOU & ROBINSON, supra note 39, at 235–
40. 
 64.  Seidler, supra note 29, at 3–4. 
 65.  Id. at 5–8, and Addendum; DRUKER, supra note 25, at 204. 
 66.  Montgomery, supra note 36, at 358. 
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which is no longer a risk but a reality.67  In Mexico, for example, 
nearly all traditional varieties of corn have been found to have at least 
some GMO contamination.68  In Canada, organic farmers have sued 
GMO producers because cross-pollination has made it virtually 
impossible for them to grow non-contaminated organic canola.69 
Contamination by genetically engineered non-food pharmacrops is 
also a significant concern.70  One of the more alarming examples of 
contamination through GM gene drift was a case where pollen from a 
corn crop genetically engineered to produce a pharmaceutical that 
would prevent diarrhea in pigs contaminated nearby soybean fields 
meant for human consumption.71  In another case, GM corn intended 
only for animal consumption due to its known allergenic properties, 
was mixed, post-cultivation, with corn meant for human 
consumption.72  Although GMO proponents argue that contamination 
in both cases was either caught prior to human consumption or that 
no adverse health effects were reported, critics have pointed to these 
incidents of contamination and containment failure as evidence of 
insufficient federal regulatory oversight.73 
 
 67.  See Gibson, supra note 5, at 249–53 (describing processes of “gene flow” and instances 
in which gene flow was a concern); Margaret Rosso Grossman, Biotechnology, Property Rights 
and the Environment, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 215, 216 (2002) (“‘[W]ind blown pollen, commingled 
seeds and black-market plantings’ mean that GM products extend beyond the acres officially 
planted to GM crops.” (quoting David Barboza, As Biotech Crops Multiply, Consumers Get 
Little Choice, N.Y. TIMES (June 10, 2001), http://www.nytimes.com/2001/06/10/us/as-biotech-
crops-multiply-consumers-get-little-choice.html)). 
 68.  Institute for Responsible Technology, Dangers to the Environment, 
http://www.responsibletechnology.org/gmo-dangers/dangers-to-the-environment (last visited 
Nov. 4, 2015). 
 69.  Id. 
 70.  See, e.g., Ctr. for Food Safety v. Johanns, 451 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1170 (D. Haw. 2006) 
(“Because these crops produce experimental pharmaceutical products . . . their effect on 
Hawaii’s ecosystem (especially Hawaii’s 329 endangered and threatened species) is unclear. . . . 
[T]hese experimental crops could cross-pollinate with existing food crops, thus contaminating 
the food supply.”). 
 71.  Muramoto, supra note 21, at 345 (discussing the ProdiGene case); MICHAEL R. 
TAYLOR, JODY S. TICK & DIANE M. SHERMAN, PEW INITIATIVE, TENDING THE FIELDS: STATE 
& FEDERAL ROLES IN THE OVERSIGHT OF GENETICALLY MODIFIED CROPS 27 (2004). 
 72.  Muramoto, supra note 21, at 344 (discussing the StarLink corn episode); TAYLOR, 
TICK & SHERMAN, supra note 71 (also discussing StarLink). 
 73.  See Muramoto, supra note 21, at 343–44 (noting that repeated incidents of cross 
contamination “all illustrate significant and glaring defects in the regulatory framework for 
agricultural biotechnology including: (1) a lack of systematic risk assessment prior to the release 
or marketing of the GE product in question, (2) a lack of surveillance or monitoring of the GE 
product after it has been released into the environment or marketplace, and (3) a lack of 
coordination between the agencies during all stages of the risk management process”); Gibson, 
supra note 5, at 246–47 (discussing insufficiency of the Federal Coordinated Framework to meet 
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Contamination by GM crops can also have a devastating 
economic impact on organic and traditional farmers.74  Organic 
farmers in particular must meet stringent organic certification 
standards and satisfy consumer demand for organic purity.75  
Measures to prevent or detect contamination are costly, but once 
their crops are impermissibly contaminated with GMOs, organic 
growers cannot meet these standards, and consumers looking for 
GMO-free options will also no longer buy their products.76  
Contamination by GM crops also presents significant risks to entire 
sectors that want to sell their non-GM crops internationally, since 
many countries are reluctant or even unwilling to purchase GM food 
crops.77 
Despite these real and potential impacts to public health, the 
environment, and the viability of non-GM agriculture, GM crops 
have been widely adopted by U.S. commercial agricultural 
operations.  Today, millions of acres of U.S. farmland are devoted to 
GM crop cultivation.78  Indeed, even as first generation GM crops 
continue to generate significant criticism and calls for a return to the 
precautionary principle, the agricultural biotech industry has 
proceeded to launch second and even third generation GM crops and 
products, arguably unfettered by meaningful or effective regulatory 
oversight.79 
 
either the needs of the GE Industry or the public’s concerns). 
 74.  TAYLOR, TICK & SHERMAN, supra note 71, at 27 (“No issue involving biotech crops 
and foods has received more attention within state governments, the agricultural community, 
and from the media, than the technology’s potential to hurt market access for conventional and 
organic crops.”); see also Strauss, The Role of Courts, supra note 55, at 270 (“Already, incidents 
of contamination have led to numerous lawsuits by traditional and organic farmers for their 
economic loss and injury.”). 
 75.  Grossman, supra note 67, at 221–22. 
 76.  Id. This was precisely the concern of a 2006 federal lawsuit brought by organic farmers 
to try to halt the cultivation of GM alfalfa. See DRUKER, supra note 25, at 203. 
 77.  See, e.g., Gibson, supra note 5, at 252 (“Because of the GE contamination, Japan 
temporarily suspended importation of U.S. wheat for nearly two months.”); see also TAYLOR, 
TICK & SHERMAN, supra note 71, at 115–20 (describing debate in northern plain states over 
whether to ban planting of GM wheat in order to protect access to foreign markets in which 
biotech wheat was likely to be rejected by consumers); Montgomery, supra note 36, at 356–57 
(discussing the LibertyLink rice case, “where an experimental strain of GM rice ‘cross-bred with 
and ‘contaminated’ over 30 percent of U.S. ricelands,’ causing futures prices of U.S. rice to fall 
significantly”). 
 78.  Montgomery, supra note 36, at 353. 
 79.  McGarity, supra note 17, at 492 (The “precautionary principle” suggests regulatory 
policy that errs on the side of safety “when substantial uncertainties prevent accurate risk 
assessments”). 
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II. THE CURRENT REGULATORY FRAMEWORK GOVERNING GMOS 
In the United States, the federal government primarily regulates 
GMOs through three of its federal agencies: the United States 
Department of Agriculture (USDA), the EPA, and the FDA.80  
However, state and local governments also retain the ability to 
regulate GMOs, provided that such state or local regulation is not 
pre-empted by existing federal or state law.81 
A. Federal Regulatory Framework 
Critics of the federal regulatory framework argue that it is 
needlessly fractured and contains glaring gaps in regulatory 
oversight.82  Others suggest that the agencies charged with oversight 
have grown increasingly dependent upon, and thus improperly 
influenced by, the very industries they are supposed to regulate, 
leading to policies and procedures that promote industry interests 
over legitimate public health, safety, and environmental concerns.83  
However, GMO proponents argue that GMOs are extensively 
regulated from initial field-testing to their final distribution in the 
commercial marketplace.84 
Much of the criticism of the federal regulatory framework stems 
from the fact that there is no one federal agency tasked with 
regulating biotechnology in the United States.85  Instead, in 1986, the 
White House Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) 
created the “Coordinated Framework for Regulation of 
Biotechnology,” which divided the authority to regulate 
biotechnology among the USDA, the EPA, and the FDA.86  The 
 
 80.  See discussion infra pt. II.A. 
 81.  See discussion infra pt. II.B, II.C. 
 82.  See Muramoto, supra note 21, at 343–44; McGarity, supra note 17, at 432; Gibson, 
supra note 5, at 246; Montgomery, supra note 36, at 354–55. 
 83.  See Hosmer, supra note 5, at 649–50 (discussing how “agencies overseeing GMOs have 
become increasingly dependent on, and influenced by, the very industries they regulate”). 
 84.  See, e.g., MONSANTO.COM, Commonly Asked Questions, supra note 52 (declaring that 
“strong regulatory frameworks” ensure the safety of GMO food); but see FAGAN, ANTONIOU & 
ROBINSON, supra note 39, at 57 (“Claims that GM foods are extensively tested and strictly 
regulated are false.”). 
 85.  See Strauss, The Role of Courts, supra note 55, at 272 (“The existing framework of 
power sharing between the USDA, EPA, and FDA yields an incomplete regulatory scheme.”); 
Muramoto, supra note 21, at 316–17; Hosmer, supra note 5, at 649. 
 86.  Office of Science and Technology Policy, Exercise of Federal Oversight Within Scope 
of Statutory Authority: Planned Introductions of Biotechnology Products Into the 
Environment, 57 Fed. Reg. 6753, 3 (Feb. 27, 1992). 
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OSTP then determined that existing federal laws would be sufficient 
to govern this new technology.87 
1. USDA 
GM crops first come under federal regulatory oversight through 
the Federal Plant Protection Act (PPA), which gives the Secretary of 
Agriculture the ability to prohibit or restrict the importation, 
exportation, and interstate movement of plants, plant products, 
biological control organisms, plant pests, and noxious weeds.88  
Because the majority of GM crops are considered to be “potential 
plant pests,” the USDA, through its Animal and Plant Health 
Inspection Service (APHIS), is responsible for overseeing the field 
testing of GM crops and for determining when a GM crop is no 
longer a potential plant pest and thus ready for commercial 
production.89 
Initial field-testing allows GM growers to evaluate a GM crop’s 
performance under normal growing conditions.90  It also purportedly 
allows the GM growers, and APHIS, the time and ability to rule out 
any plant pest risks.91 In reality, however, APHIS oversight of most 
GM crop field-testing is minimal.92  All that is generally required 
before a GM grower begins field testing a new GM crop is to notify 
APHIS of its intention to do so.93  Under the notification process, 
APHIS’s only responsibility is simply to acknowledge its receipt of 
notification from the grower within thirty days. 94 The GM grower 
performs its own risk evaluation to determine whether the GM plant 
may be a plant pest, and no other health or environmental assessment 
is required by APHIS.95 Approximately ninety-seven to ninety-nine 
percent of all field trials take place under this simple notification 
process.96 
 
 87.  Coordinated Framework for the Regulation of Biotechnology, 51 Fed. Reg. 23302, 
23303, 23306 (June 26, 1986) (“Existing statutes provide a basic network of agency jurisdiction 
over both research and products; this network forms the basis of this coordinated framework 
and helps assure reasonable safeguards for the public.”). 
 88.  Plant Protection Act, 7 U.S.C. § 7714 (2002). 
 89.  Gibson, supra note 5, at 234; USDA REPORT, supra note 31, at 4. 
 90.  TAYLOR, TICK & SHERMAN, supra note 71, at 44. 
 91.  Id. 
 92.  Id. 
 93.  Muramoto, supra note 21, at 318. 
 94.  Id. 
 95.  Id. 
 96.  Id. 
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For the remaining one to three percent of GM crops, which 
consist mainly of those GM crops that: (a) contain DNA from an 
animal or human pathogen; (b) contain genes of unknown function; 
(c) have toxic, infectious, or pharmaceutical properties; or (d) are 
considered too “genetically unstable;” an APHIS permit may be 
required.97  Permit applications are supposed to contain information 
about the biology of the GM plant and its potential plant pest 
properties, as well as any measures the applicant intends to use to 
contain the GM crop or dispose of it following the field trial.98 The 
permitting process takes up to 120 days, and containment to prevent 
cross-contamination of non-GM species is the primary consideration 
for APHIS, rather than any other health or environmental risks.99 
After all field trials have been conducted, a GM grower can 
petition APHIS for “deregulated status,” so that the GM crop can be 
grown on a commercial scale.100  The APHIS deregulation process is 
also narrowly focused on whether the GM plant itself poses a plant 
pest risk.101  It does not typically require rigorous environmental or 
health review.102  Once deregulated, the GM crop is no longer subject 
to any further APHIS oversight, and no follow up tests can be 
required by the agency.103 There is also no post-market monitoring of 
the deregulated GM crops by APHIS.104 
Many have criticized the APHIS review process, including the 
USDA itself.105  Criticism has focused around: (a) the lack of rigorous 
health and environmental assessments in the notification, permitting, 
and deregulation processes; (b) APHIS’ overreliance on GM 
producers’ own self-interested assessments of any plant pest risks; and 
 
 97.  Id. 
 98.  TAYLOR, TICK & SHERMAN, supra note 71, at 45. 
 99.  Muramoto, supra note 21, at 319; Tokar, supra note 34, at 2. 
 100.  Muramoto, supra note 21, at 319. 
 101.  Id. at 367. 
 102.  See id. at 318 (“Prior to conducting a field trial of a new transgenic plant, a developer 
must perform a risk evaluation on the plant to determine whether [it] may be a plant pest. No 
consideration of any other risks, such as other human health or environmental risks is 
required.”) (internal citations omitted); see also Gibson, supra note 5, at 239 (noting that of the 
90 crops that have been deregulated, APHIS has conducted only two Environmental Impact 
Statements, both “as a result of court orders”). 
 103.  Gibson, supra note 5, at 239. 
 104.  Id. 
 105.  See U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., AUDIT REPORT: 
ANIMAL AND PLANT HEALTH INSPECTION SERVICE CONTROLS OVER ISSUANCE OF 
GENETICALLY MODIFIED ORGANISMS RELEASE PERMITS, AUDIT #50601-8-TE, i–iv (Dec. 
2005) (discussing the weaknesses in the APHIS regulations and internal management controls). 
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(c) APHIS’ inability to monitor GM crops once they have been 
deregulated, particularly when health and environmental harms might 
not become apparent until after commercial planting is initiated.106  
Other critics have also pointed to a large regulatory gap: plants that 
are genetically engineered with genes that are not considered to be 
“plant pests” themselves escape APHIS regulatory oversight 
altogether.107 
2.  EPA 
GM crops that contain pesticides are also regulated by the 
EPA.108  The EPA has the authority to regulate these crops under the 
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA).109  The 
EPA also has authority to regulate allowable pesticide tolerances in 
food through the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA).110 
The EPA regulates conventional pesticides via use restrictions 
contained on the EPA-approved labels accompanying the pesticides 
themselves.111  However, EPA regulation of GM crops containing 
pesticides (known as “plant incorporated protectants” or “PIPs”) is 
muddled by the EPA’s own decision to only regulate the genetic 
material inserted into the GM plant and the products the genetic 
material expresses (i.e., the Bt gene and the pesticidal substance), not 
the GM plant itself.112   This decision to regulate only the genetic 
material and not the GM plant itself creates a confusing regulatory 
gap.  This is because FIFRA assures safe use of a pesticide only 
through the FIFRA labeling requirements, and since the genetic 
material – the Bt toxin – is produced in the tissues of the GM plant 
itself, there is no “labeling” requirement.113  Even the PIP seed bags 
do not need to comply with FIFRA labeling requirements.114   The 
EPA does try to exert some regulatory control over PIPs through the 
pesticide registration process itself by requiring PIP registrants to 
enter into contractual agreements with their GMO growers to comply 
 
 106.  Id.; Montgomery, supra note 36, at 367–70. 
 107.  Montgomery, supra note 36, at 351–52. 
 108.  Muramoto, supra note 21, at 322. 
 109.  Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 136–136y (1996). 
 110.  Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 346a(b)(1) (1960). 
 111.  TAYLOR, TICK & SHERMAN, supra note 71, at 51. 
 112.  Muramoto, supra note 21, at 322. 
 113.  Id. 
 114.  Id. 
Barnett-Rose-Macro (Do Not Delete) 2/9/2016  4:55 PM 
88 DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM [Vol. XXVI:71 
with certain PIP planting restrictions.115  The EPA also requires 
experimental use permits (EUP’s) when a GM applicant wishes to 
field test a PIP that incorporates an experimental pesticide.116  
Otherwise, however, the EPA’s regulatory oversight for pesticide-
containing GM crops is minimal.117  
3.  FDA 
The final link in the GM food crop regulatory chain is by way of 
the FDA.  The FDA is responsible for the safety of all food products 
in the United States, other than meat and poultry.118  The FDA’s 
primary regulatory authority is through the Federal Food, Drug, and 
Cosmetic Act (FFDCA), which allows the FDA to regulate 
“adulterated foods” and “food additives.”119  
Unfortunately, due to a controversial 1992 FDA policy, foods 
containing GMOs are not generally treated as “food additives” or 
“adulterated foods” and regulated accordingly.120  Instead, foods 
containing GMOs are presumptively “generally recognized as safe” 
(GRAS), as long as the genetic material found in the GM food 
products, such as proteins, carbohydrates, fats, and oils, are “already 
present at generally comparable levels or greater in currently 
consumed foods.”121  GM foods that are presumed to be GRAS do not 
need to undergo any formal FDA review process or independent 
safety testing, despite the novelty of their creation process.122  GM 
producers also make the GRAS determinations themselves; 
consultation with the FDA is purely voluntary.123  In addition to not 
 
 115.  TAYLOR, TICK & SHERMAN, supra note 71, at 51. The primary concern of planting 
restrictions is to prevent the development of superbugs resistant to Bt toxin, which would result 
in loss of effectiveness for both GM plants and the traditional use of Bt toxin by organic 
agriculture. Id. 
 116.  Id. 
 117.  Tokar, supra note 34, at 6. 
 118.  Muramoto, supra note 21, at 320–21 (noting that the USDA regulates meat and 
poultry). 
 119.  Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301–399d (2006). 
 120.  Food and Drug Administration, Statement of Policy: Foods Derived from New Plant 
Varieties, 57 Fed. Reg. 22,984 (May 29, 1992). 
 121.  Id. at 22,990 (“When the substance present in the [genetically modified] food is one 
that is already present at generally comparable or greater levels in currently consumed foods, 
there is unlikely to be a safety question sufficient to call into question the presumed GRAS 
status of such naturally occurring substances and thus warrant formal premarket review and 
approval by FDA.”). 
 122.  Id. at 22,989. 
 123.  Id. 
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requiring any pre-market safety testing, the FDA also does not 
require GM producers to: (a) notify the FDA prior to putting a new 
GRAS GM food product into the food supply; or (b) label food 
products as containing GMOs, despite widespread consumer desire 
for this information.124  Although the FDA has issued voluntary 
labeling guidelines for GMO producers who wish to provide GMO 
information to consumers anyway, these voluntary labeling guidelines 
have not been followed by a single GM food producer in the roughly 
fifteen years they have been in place.125  
GMO critics have long argued that the FDA violated its own 
stringent regulations in granting GM food products presumptive 
GRAS status.126  This is because under the terms of the FFDCA, a 
GRAS determination must meet two criteria.  First, there must be 
technical evidence of safety, usually in published scientific studies.127 
Second, the technical evidence must be generally known and accepted 
by the relevant scientific community.128  A severe conflict among 
experts should preclude a finding of GRAS.129   Thus, because there 
remains a deep scientific divide as to the safety of GM foods, critics 
contend that the FDA’s granting of presumptive GRAS status for 
GM foods has been deeply political and highly irregular.130  
Nevertheless, the FDA has not elected to amend its controversial 
1992 policy, and in Alliance for Bio-Integrity v. Shalala, the federal 
district court of the D.C. Circuit determined that the FDA’s decision 
to grant GM foods the presumption of GRAS status was not 
“arbitrary and capricious.”131  
 
 
 124.  See All. for Bio-Integrity v. Shalala, 116 F. Supp. 166, 176 (D.D.C. 2000) (explaining 
lack of requirements for GM producers); Kopicki, Strong Support for Labeling, supra note 58 
(identifying “a New York Times Poll conducted this year, with 93 percent of respondents saying 
that [genetically modified or engineered] foods containing such ingredients should be labeled”); 
see also Muramoto, supra note 21, at 320 (“[I]t is the manufacturer, not the FDA, which makes 
the initial determination whether a food or food additive is GRAS.”). 
 125.  See Muramoto, supra note 21, at 338–39 (noting that, rather than regulating GMO 
producers, the FDA focuses its regulatory attention on non-GMO producers who wish to label 
their products “GMO-free”). 
 126.  See generally DRUKER, supra note 25, at 127–66. 
 127.  All. for Bio-Integrity, 116 F. Supp. 2d at 177. 
 128.  Id. 
 129.  Id. 
 130.  Id.; see also DRUKER, supra note 25, at 141–44. 
 131.  All. for Bio-Integrity, 116 F. Supp. 2d at 177. 
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B. State Regulation of GMOs 
Obvious gaps in the federal regulatory framework for GMOs 
have prompted at least a few states to take supplemental regulatory 
action.132  Several states, such as Idaho, Minnesota, Oklahoma, 
Wisconsin, and Washington, have specifically reserved the right to 
require separate state-issued permits prior to GMO cultivation, while 
other states such as Alaska, Connecticut, Maine, and Vermont have 
enacted some form of GMO food or seed labeling law.133  Other than 
these limited efforts however, it would appear that a majority of 
states are content to rely entirely upon the regulatory oversight of the 
federal agencies.134 
Part of this reluctance to regulate the biotech industry is 
undoubtedly political.  While state legislatures do have an interest in 
protecting their citizens against potential harms from GMOs, they 
also recognize the significant revenue to be captured from the biotech 
industry, which understandably favors minimal regulatory intrusion.135  
Political considerations aside, given the federal regulatory 
framework, states may also feel constrained by the U.S. Supremacy 
Clause and federal pre-emption concerns.136  Under the Supremacy 
Clause, federal laws governing the same subject matter may pre-empt 
state or local laws when: (1) the federal law expressly pre-empts state 
or local law; (2) there is a conflict between the federal statute and the 
state or local law that would prevent the targeted entities from being 
able to comply with both; or (3) the federal statute so clearly and 
completely occupies a field that there is “no room” for supplemental 
state or local regulation.137   However, there is a presumption against 
federal pre-emption, and courts reviewing express pre-emption 
provisions in a federal statute are required to construe these 
 
 132.  See TAYLOR, TICK & SHERMAN, supra note 71, at 41 tbl. 1 (listing state biotech-
specific regulatory statutes). 
 133.  Id.; see also Eden & Whitfield, supra note 3 (indicating that most of the states 
requiring separate state permitting provide an exemption if the federal government has already 
issued permits via APHIS). 
 134.  See TAYLOR, TICK, & SHERMAN, supra note 71, at 106 (“[M]ost states do not have 
biotech-specific regulatory statutes, and there is a general preference among state regulators 
and stakeholders to rely on federal regulatory agencies to ensure the safety of biotech crops and 
foods for humans, plants, and the environment.”). 
 135.  See generally Blanchard supra note 34; Hosmer, supra note 5, at 665 (“The 
biotechnology industry is a multi-billion dollar per year industry that creates thousands of jobs, 
so state and federal policy makers are hesitant to increase regulation of that sector.”). 
 136.  Doug Farquhar & Liz Meyer, State Authority to Regulate Biotechnology Under the 
Federal Coordinated Framework, 12 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 439, 461 –72 (2007). 
 137.  Hillsborough Cty., Fla. v. Automated Med. Labs, Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 713 (1985). 
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provisions narrowly.138   Moreover, due to the difficulty in determining 
Congressional intent, implied pre-emption is even less favored, and 
courts considering whether a state statute or local ordinance is 
impliedly pre-empted by existing federal law are required to begin 
with the presumption that the state statute or local ordinance was a 
valid exercise of authority.139 
Of the three primary federal statutes regulating GMOs, only the 
PPA has an express pre-emption provision.140  Thus, states and local 
governments should have considerable authority to regulate GMOs 
concurrently with the federal framework.141 
1.  States’ Rights to Regulate Plant Pests 
States have long held the right to control plant pests and noxious 
weeds intrastate.142  Accordingly, most states have a variety of 
agricultural, quarantine, and/or other public health laws that address 
or seek to prevent the importation and/or the spread of plant pests 
and noxious weeds within their borders.143  However, because the 
federal PPA also attempts to control and prevent the importation, 
exportation, and spread of plant pests and noxious weeds interstate, 
and because the majority of current GM plants are considered to be 
“potential plant pests” under the PPA, there is uncertainty over 
whether the express pre-emption provision of the PPA precludes 
wholly intrastate regulation of GM plants considered to be “potential 
plant pests.” 144   
 
 138.  Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 449 (2005). 
 139.  See Wis. Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 611–14 (1991) (holding that FIFRA 
is not so comprehensive a federal regulation that it impliedly pre-empts state regulation); 
Maureen Bessette, Genetic Engineering: The Alternative of Self-Regulation for Local 
Governments, 22 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1121, 1140 (1988) (stating that there is a presumption that 
the Supremacy clause does not pre-empt state or local regulation of matters related to health 
and safety). 
 140.  Plant Protection Act, 7 U.S.C. § 7756(b)(1) (2006). 
 141.  See generally Farquhar & Meyer, supra note 136, at 473 (concluding that there is no 
Congressional intent specific to biotechnology to reference when determining whether a state 
statute is pre-empted). 
 142.  TAYLOR, TICK & SHERMAN, supra note 71, at 39. 
 143.  Id. 
 144.  Compare Farquhar & Meyer, supra note 136, at 462 (suggesting that the PPA leaves 
little room for states to regulate PPA regulated articles once APHIS has acted), with Gibson, 
supra note 5, at 240–41 (“Although the PPA contains a pre-emption provision, states are clearly 
free to address local plant pest concerns if no interstate or foreign commerce is involved, and 
they can regulate movements in ‘interstate commerce’ if APHIS has not acted.”) (internal 
citations omitted); see also Thomas Connor, Genetically Modified Torts: Enlisting the Tort 
System to Regulate Agricultural Contamination by Biotech Crops, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 1187, 1200  
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The answer seems fairly straightforward.  The express pre-
emption provision of the PPA explicitly states that it seeks to 
preclude a state from regulating the “movement in interstate 
commerce” of any articles also regulated under the PPA.145  This 
suggests that wholly intrastate regulation of GM crops, even those 
considered to be “potential plant pests” under the PPA, would not 
fall within the express pre-emption provision.146 Recently, however, in 
both Hawaii Floriculture v. County of Hawaii and Robert Ito Farm, 
Inc. v. County of Maui, the federal district court of Hawaii interpreted 
the pre-emption provision of the PPA expansively to include pre-
emption of wholly intrastate plant pest regulation, despite the narrow 
language of the express pre-emption provision itself.147 
2.  States’ Rights to Regulate Pesticide Usage and PIPs 
States have an even clearer right to regulate pesticide usage 
within their borders, and to enact laws that are more protective of 
human health than provided by federal law.148  In fact, FIFRA 
expressly authorizes states and local governments to also regulate 
pesticide usage, as long as their pesticide laws are at least as stringent 
as the EPA’s and do not conflict with FIFRA’s labeling and 
notification requirements.149  States may therefore: (1) require greater 
warnings to the general public of a pesticide’s use; (2) register 
pesticides for additional uses to meet local needs; and (3) establish 
their own experimental use permitting procedures that differ from the 
EPA’s EUP program.150  
Evidence suggests, however, that very few states issue their own 
EUP’s or require other permitting procedures beyond the EPA’s own 
 
n.83 (2006–2007) (“Because the use of biotech crops implicates both national and local 
concerns, courts and legislatures should be wary of overly broad federal preemption of state 
attempts to regulate distinctly local matters such as land-use and growing procedures . . . .”). 
 145.  7 U.S.C. § 7756(b)(1) (2006). 
 146.  Id. 
 147.  Haw. Floriculture & Nursery Ass’n v. Cty. of Haw., No. 14-00267 BMK, 2014 WL 
6685817, at *7–9 (D. Haw. Nov. 26, 2014); Robert Ito Farm, Inc. v. Cty. of Maui, Nos. 14-00511, 
14-00582 SOM/BMK, 2015 WL 4041480, at *9–14 (D. Haw. June 30, 2015); see discussion infra 
pt. IV. 
 148.  See Wis. Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 605 (1991) (“When considering pre-
emption, we start with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not to 
be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.”). 
 149.  7 U.S.C.A. § 136v(a)–(b) (West 2015). 
 150.  TAYLOR, TICK & SHERMAN, supra note 71, at 53. For example, although FIFRA only 
requires EUPs for experimental field testing on 10 acres or more, in Hawaii an EUP is required 
for experimental use testing on greater than a quarter acre. Id. 
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registration and permitting procedures.151  Nor do most states review 
federally-issued EUP’s or play any role in federal pesticide 
registration decisions.152  In addition, because of the way the EPA has 
characterized PIP’s (plants genetically engineered to contain 
pesticides within their tissues), states have very little involvement in 
regulating or overseeing PIP crops.153  Although states could legally 
require that GM producers register PIP’s with the state and/or seek 
state experimental use permits for PIP’s, a 2004 Pew Initiative survey 
revealed that the overwhelming majority of states choose not to 
regulate in this way.154  
3.  States’ Rights to Regulate GMO Foods 
Finally, states have an interest in food purity and food safety and 
all states have regulatory laws that authorize them to remove 
adulterated or misbranded foods from the market.155  However, states 
generally do not require any pre-market testing of new food products, 
including any testing of genetically engineered food products.156   
Still, food safety has long been considered a recognized area of 
local concern, and the FFDCA does not contain any express pre-
emption provisions.157  Thus, states presumably should be permitted to 
enact more stringent regulations governing GM food products than 
the FFDCA without risk of federal pre-emption, as long as there is no 
direct conflict between state law and existing federal regulations, and 
as long as the state regulations do not unduly burden interstate 
commerce.158  
Because there are no express pre-emption provisions in the 
FFDCA, states should also be free to require GMO producers to 
label their GM food products within the state.  Although the FDA 
issued voluntary labeling guidelines for GMO producers back in 2001, 
the guidelines are not federal regulations and are not mandatory on 
 
 151.  Id. at 54. 
 152.  Id. 
 153.  Id. at 55–57. 
 154.  Id. at 56–57. 
 155.  Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 144 (1963); TAYLOR, TICK 
& SHERMAN, supra note 71, at 61. 
 156.  TAYLOR, TICK & SHERMAN, supra note 71, at 61. 
 157.  Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, 373 U.S. at 144. 
 158.  See Farquhar & Meyer, supra note 136, at 468 (“Because food safety is generally a 
local concern, courts require either explicit pre-emption or conflict pre-emption in order to pre-
empt a state or local regulation . . . In addition . . . a state must also ensure that its laws do not 
impose an unreasonable burden on interstate commerce.”). 
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GMO producers, and therefore should lack any pre-emptive effect.159   
While the federal Nutritional Labeling and Education Act (NLEA) 
does contain express pre-emption provisions prohibiting states from 
enacting food labeling requirements that are “not identical” to 
mandatory food labeling requirements of the FFDCA, the lack of any 
FFDCA mandatory food labeling requirements for GMO foods 
should also preclude any NLEA pre-emptive effect.160  Indeed, this 
was the recent outcome in Grocery Manufacturers Association v. 
Sorrell, where a federal district court judge explicitly rejected the 
plaintiff GMO manufacturers’ FFDCA and NLEA labeling pre-
emption challenges to Vermont’s newly enacted GMO food labeling 
law.161  The Vermont law is set to go into effect in 2016.162 
C.  Local Authority to Regulate GMOs 
Local governments perhaps have the most pressing interest in 
regulating GMOs cultivated or distributed within their borders, as 
they are the closest to any direct health, environmental, or economic 
consequences of under-regulation.163  In fact, local governments were 
the first to respond to the federal government’s lax regulatory 
oversight of GMOs by taking precautions of their own.164  For 
example, in 1976, the city council in Cambridge, Massachusetts passed 
the country’s very first moratorium on GMO research in order to 
allow a local committee to investigate the risks associated with it.165  
Then, in 1985, after the EPA issued the very first experimental use 
permit that would have allowed field-testing of a genetically 
engineered pesticide in Monterey, California, local citizens rallied 
against it and a local ordinance subsequently prevented its release.166  
Currently, eleven local governments have exercised their authority to 
 
 159.  See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS, DRAFT GUIDANCE 
FOR INDUSTRY: VOLUNTARY LABELING INDICATING WHETHER FOODS HAVE OR HAVE NOT 
BEEN DEVELOPED USING BIOENGINEERING; AVAILABILITY at 6–7 (2001). 
 160.  21 U.S.C.A. § 343-1(a)(1)–(5) (West 2015). 
 161.  Grocery Mfrs. Ass’n v. Sorrell, No. 5:14-cv-117, 2015 WL 1931142, at *24–25 (D. Vt. 
Apr. 27, 2015). 
 162.  Id. at *2. 
 163.  See generally, Charles J. Bussell, As Montville Goes, So Goes Wolcott, Vermont? A 
Primer on the Local Regulation of Genetically Modified Crops, 43 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 727 
(2010) (explaining that local government may have increased interest in GMO regulation). 
 164.  Bessette, supra note 139, at 1125. 
 165.  Id. at 1142. 
 166.  Id. at 1135–36. 
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regulate GMOs locally.167  The majority of these local governments 
are located in the Western states of Oregon, Washington, and 
California.168  Most of these local ordinances significantly restrict or 
outright ban the cultivation and field-testing of GMOs.169  On the east 
coast, only one town in Maine has a GMO regulation in effect.170  
Other east coast communities have been unable to regulate GMOs 
because they are restricted by their enabling legislation or are pre-
empted by state law.171  These communities have resorted to passing 
non-binding resolutions to express their distaste for genetically 
engineered crops in the hope that the resolutions will “spur the state 
legislature” to regulate GMOs at the state level.172 
Nevertheless, despite these regulatory actions by a small number 
of local governments, many local governments may lack the authority 
to regulate GMOs.173  Local governments receive their authority to 
regulate either through a constitutional “home rule” amendment or 
by specific enabling legislation.174  Home rule local authority typically 
presumes broad local authority to regulate, while enabling legislation 
generally restricts local government regulation to areas specified 
within the enabling legislation.175  In either case, however, states 
typically retain the right to pre-empt a local government’s ability to 
regulate when a particular subject matter area is determined to be of 
statewide concern.176 
 
 167.  See Edens & Whitfield, supra note 3. As of the completion of this article, local 
regulations of GMOs were in effect in California (Marin, Medocino, Santa Cruz, and Trinity 
counties, and the cities of Arcata and Point Arena), Oregon (Jackson and Josephine counties), 
Washington (San Juan county), and Maine (town of Montville). See id. 
 168.  Id. 
 169.  Id.  Although outright bans of GMO cultivation and field testing may seem extreme in 
the United States, GMO cultivation and field testing is currently banned in numerous countries. 
See Walden Bello & Foreign Policy in Focus, Twenty-Six Countries Ban GMO’s—Why Won’t 
the U.S.?, THE NATION (Oct. 29, 2013), http://www.thenation.com/blog/176863/ twenty-six-
countries-ban-gmos-why-wont-us. 
 170.  See generally Bussell, supra note 163 (discussing the regulation of GMOs in effect in 
Montville, Maine). 
 171.  Id. at 738–39. 
 172.  Id. 
 173.  Id. at 735. 
 174.  Bessette, supra note 139, at 1137. 
 175.  Id. at 1137–38. 
 176.  See Randall E. Kromm, Town Initiative and State Pre-emption in the Environmental 
Area: A Massachusetts Case Study, 22 HARV. ENT’L L. REV. 241, 256–57 (1998) (listing three 
distinct ways in which state law may supersede local initiatives); Paul Diller, Intrastate Pre-
emption, 87 B.U. L. REV. 1113, 1127 (2007) (“[I]t is now widely acknowledged that there are 
matters of mixed ‘local-statewide’ concern in which both the state and city may legislate, thus 
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One way a state may pre-empt a local government’s authority to 
regulate is by enacting a comprehensive state regulatory scheme that 
leaves no room for concurrent local regulation.177  When a state 
expressly indicates that it intends to occupy an entire field with its 
regulatory scheme, the pre-emption analysis would be fairly 
straightforward.178  However, if a state fails to include an express 
intention to occupy the regulated field, it would fall to a court to 
determine whether there is an implied pre-emption.179  While 
sometimes an intent to occupy an entire field can be easily gleaned 
from the comprehensiveness of the state regulation or by express 
statements of purpose that clearly indicate an intention for state-wide 
uniformity, in many cases, the “search for legislative intent is 
nebulous at best.”180  Local government scholars have described 
implied pre-emption as a “problematic shadow” that imposes “severe 
constraints on local policy innovation and choice.”181  Some have 
called it the “exercise of judicial judgment in the absence of a 
legislative one.”182 
Another way states can pre-empt local regulation is through 
“denial authority.”183 Denial authority occurs when a state expressly 
denies a local government the ability to regulate in a specified area, 
without actually enacting any substantive legislation of its own.184  
Denial authority is a particularly restrictive form of state pre-emption 
because it runs the risk of producing “a regulatory vacuum on issues 
of considerable importance.”185 
With respect to the local regulation of GMOs, although a 
majority of states now purportedly give their local governments some 
form of “home rule” authority, as of 2014, roughly seventeen states 
have enacted express pre-emption provisions denying local 
governments the ability to regulate GMOs.186  Significantly, California 
 
raising the possibility of pre-emption in the mixed sphere.”). 
 177.  Kromm, supra note 176, at 256–57. 
 178.  Diller, supra note 176, at 1115–16. 
 179.  Id. 
 180.  George D. Vaubel, Toward Principles of State Restraint upon the Exercise of Municipal 
Power in Home Rule, 22 STETSON L. REV. 643, 684 (1993). 
 181.  Diller, supra note 176, at 1116. 
 182.  Vaubel, supra note 180, at 684. 
 183.  Kromm, supra note 176, at 256–57. 
 184.  Id. at 256. 
 185.  Id. at 257. 
 186.  See Porter, supra note 4, at 15 (noting that most express pre-emption provisions 
precluding local GMO regulations are drafted by way of precluding any local regulation of 
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and Oregon recently joined the express pre-emption states, despite 
the fact that most of the current local GMO regulations originate in 
these states and community interest in local regulation remains 
high.187  Unfortunately, because the exercise of denial authority has 
come without the states enacting any comprehensive GMO legislation 
of their own, the exercise of denial authority in these states appears to 
be largely the result of biotech industry influence.188 
Although a “hot zone” of GMO cultivation and field-testing for 
over twenty years, the state of Hawaii has not yet elected to expressly 
pre-empt local regulation of GMOs.189  However, in 2013–2014, after 
three local Hawaii counties enacted local ordinances in response to 
citizens’ concerns, GMO producers immediately challenged the 
ordinances in federal court on state and federal pre-emption 
grounds.190 
III. GMOS IN HAWAII AND THE LOCAL REGULATORY RESPONSE 
GMO activity in Hawaii revolves around two main areas of 
operation: (1) cultivation of GM crop seeds for export and 
commercial production; and (2) field trials of new GM crops that 
have not yet been approved for commercial production.191  GMO 
cultivation and field testing in Hawaii raises similar concerns as those 
raised in other jurisdictions.192 However, Hawaii is the world’s top 
 
“seed”); see also ORGANIC CONSUMERS ASS’N, State/Local Efforts  to Control GMOs, 
https://www.organicconsumers.org/news/statelocal-efforts-control-gmos (last visited Sept. 5, 
2015) (indicating that the states pre-empting local GMO regulation include Arizona, Florida, 
Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South 
Dakota, Texas, and West Virginia). 
 187.  See Edens & Whitfield, supra note 3 (noting a number of counties in California and 
Oregon that have prohibitions against growing bioengineered plants); see also Rick Paulas, 
California Cities Cannot Ban GMOs, KCET.ORG, (Dec. 16, 2014, 11:02 AM), 
http://www.kcet.org/living/food/food-rant/california-cities-cannot-ban-gmos.html (discussing 
California’s recent pre-emption of local GMO regulation); Rebekah Wilce, Oregon’s GMO 
Sellout, PR WATCH (May 21, 2014, 10:09 AM),  http://www.prwatch.org/news/2014/05/12486/ 
oregons-gmo-sellout (discussing Oregon’s recent pre-emption of local GMO regulation). 
 188.  Porter, supra note 4, at 13–15; Britt Bailey, Preempting Democracy: Consigning 
Citizens to Spectator Status through Seed Laws, COUNCIL FOR RESPONSIBLE GENETICS, 
http://www.councilforresponsiblegenetics.org/ViewPage.aspx?pageId=89 (noting that beginning 
in 2004, “the American Farm Bureau, with support from the biotechnology industry, began a 
march of pre-emption through state legislatures.”). See also Diller, supra note 176, at 1134 
(“[T]he most common opponents of the assertion of local authority for regulatory purposes are 
businesses.”). 
 189.  See HAWAII REPORT, supra note 6, at 33–34. 
 190.  See discussion infra pt. III. 
 191.  Gibson, supra note 5, at 229–30. 
 192.  HAWAII REPORT, supra note 6, at 3; Gibson, supra note 5, at 214–15, 232. 
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producer of GM seed corn and, despite its small size, has hosted more 
cumulative field trials than any other state.193  In 2014 alone, 178 
different GMO field tests were conducted on over 1,381 sites in 
Hawaii, compared with only 175 sites in all of California.194  In 
addition, more people live in closer proximity to the GMO fields in 
Hawaii than residents in any other state.195 
Most field-testing on Hawaii is conducted by GMO industry 
giants Monsanto, Dow-Chemical, Syngenta, DuPont-Pioneer, and 
BASF, all of which own or lease prime agricultural land on Oahu, 
Kauai, Maui, and Molokai.196 Although the majority of GM field tests 
in Hawaii are for corn and soy crops, other crops, including 
experimental biopharmaceutical crops, have also been field-tested.197 
Herbicide resistance is the most frequently tested trait in 
Hawaii.198  Data suggests that GMO producers on Hawaii use an 
estimated eighteen tons of pesticides on their GM plots each year, 
with “stacked” pesticide formulations containing upwards of sixty 
active toxic ingredients.199  Applications of restricted use pesticides 
(RUPs), which are considered the most toxic to human health and 
require application by specially trained workers, are also far greater 
than the national average.200 
With residents so close to GMO fields, there has been intense 
concern over the health impacts of pesticide drift, with anecdotal 
evidence suggesting that nearby residents have already been 
sickened.201  For example, in 2013, after RUP applications to a nearby 
 
 193.  HAWAII REPORT, supra note 6, at 3. 
 194.  HAWAII REPORT, supra note 6, at 3. 
 195.  Id. at 3. 
 196.  Id. at 8 & n.1. 
 197.  Gibson, supra note 5, at 232, 256; see Ctr. for Food Safety v. Johanns, 451 F. Supp. 2d 
1165 (D. Haw. 2006) (holding that APHIS violated the Endangered Species Act by failing to 
obtain information about listed species and critical habitats from Fish and Wildlife Services and 
National Marine Fisheries Service before granting permits for growing of biopharmaceutical 
crops in Hawai’i). 
 198.  HAWAII REPORT, supra note 6, at 3, 11. 
 199.  See Mike Ludwig, On the Front Lines of Hawaii’s GMO War, TRUTHOUT.ORG  (Nov. 
21, 2013), http://www.truth-out.org/news/item/20170-on-the-front-lines-of-hawaiis-gmo-war (last 
visited Sept. 5, 2015) (noting that “the GMO seeds produced on Kauai are not considered food 
items, so the agricultural companies are allowed to use more pesticides than are traditional 
farmers”) [hereinafter Front Lines]. 
 200.  Paul Koberstein, GMO companies are dousing Hawaiian island with toxic pesticides, 
GRIST (June 16, 2014), http://grist.org/business-technology/gmo-companies-are-dousing-
hawaiian-island-with-toxic-pesticides/. 
 201.  HAWAII REPORT, supra note 6, at 18; Front Lines, supra note 199. 
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GM seed corn plot on Kauai, approximately sixty school children 
experienced headaches, dizziness, nausea and/or vomiting, with some 
requiring emergency room treatment.202  Similar adverse reactions 
following pesticide applications were reported on Oahu and in other 
communities on Kauai.203  Kauai physicians have also expressed 
concerns that RUP drift might be the cause of various respiratory 
system problems in patients with no history of respiratory issues.204  
Some physicians have gone even further, expressing concern that 
RUP applications might be behind the suspicious “cancer clusters” 
and “an unusually high number of rare birth defects” in patients 
residing close to GMO fields.205 
Much of the anger local residents feel towards the GMO industry 
in Hawaii is the result of the industry’s lack of responsiveness to local 
concerns.206  Indeed, the industry has hidden much of its GMO 
operations behind claims of “confidential business information,” 
leaving residents in the dark about the types of pesticides being 
sprayed, the GMOs being cultivated, or the location of the active test 
fields.207  The industry has also repeatedly disclaimed any 
responsibility for local illnesses believed to be RUP-related, 
suggesting local “stinkweed,” might be responsible.208  In addition to 
the belief that the GMO industry operates largely unaccountable to 
the local populace, locals have also complained that the state agencies 
charged with protecting them have been far more concerned with 
promoting the agricultural biotech industry than in ensuring citizens’ 
safety.209  Hawaii, unlike many other states, does not require buffer 
 
 202.  HAWAII REPORT, supra note 6, at 18. 
 203.  Id. at 18–19. 
 204.  Id. 
 205.  Id. at 20; Front Lines, supra note 199. 
 206.  See generally HAWAII REPORT, supra note 6, at 33–37; Mike Ludwig, Hawaii’s GMO 
War Headed to Honolulu and Federal Court, TRUTHOUT.ORG (Jan. 28, 2014, 2:24 PM), 
http://www.truth-out.org/news/item/21506-hawaiis-gmo-war-headed-to-honolulu-and-federal-
court (quoting one local resident-turned-anti-GMO activist who stated: “[The GMO 
companies’] actions prove that they do not value the health and well-being of our community 
and are only interested in their corporate profit.”) [hereinafter Headed to Honolulu]. See also 
Nana Ohkawa, Hundreds March against GMO’s in Hawaii, KITV NEWS (March 2, 2013, 4:23 
PM), http://www.kitv.com/news/hawaii/Hundreds-march-against-GMOs-in-Hawaii/19154866 
(reporting on various marches against the GMO industry throughout Hawaii). 
 207.  HAWAII REPORT, supra note 6, at 12, 15–16. 
 208.  Id. at 18; see also Reply Brief for Intervenor-Defendants-Appellants at 1, Syngenta 
Seeds, Inc. v. Cty. of Kauai, Nos. 14-16833, 14-16848, 2015 WL 2265299 (D. Haw. May 11, 2015) 
(noting that companies spraying pesticides on fields near Kauai residents have repeatedly 
denied responsibility for local illnesses). 
 209.  See generally HAWAII REPORT, supra note 6, at 18, 33–37 (stating that, on more than 
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zones between GMO fields and nearby residential areas, does not 
require any disclosures to the local communities about GMO 
activities, and does not have a pesticide poisoning surveillance system 
in place.210 
Beyond health concerns, Hawaii citizens have also expressed 
concern about the GMO industry’s potential impact on biodiversity 
and the environment.211  Hawaii is home to nearly 9,500 species found 
nowhere else on the planet.212  It has also been named “the 
endangered species capital of the world,” with “roughly 75% of 
documented species extinctions in the United States” occurring 
there.213  Evidence suggests that the pesticides and pesticide run-off 
from the GMO fields have already contributed to coral reef decline, 
amphibian malformations, bee colony collapse, and rare bird 
extinctions.214 
Another concern is the contamination of non-GM crops by 
GMOs through gene drift and cross-pollination.215  In 2004, for 
example, a citizens’ group investigating nearly 20,000 papaya trees on 
the Big Island of Hawaii revealed that fifty percent of the trees were 
genetically modified, even though eighty percent of that genetically 
modified portion were trees from organic farms.216  Preservation of 
organic agriculture is particularly important in Hawaii County, where 
certain types of GMO crops have already been prohibited in order to 
protect the county’s organic coffee and taro industries.217 
Despite attempts to resolve these various issues through the state 
legislature, all bills introduced to require more protective regulation 
of GMOs at the state level have failed to pass.218  Frustrated by the 
 
one occasion, county ordinances enacted to protect residents from pesticide drift were declared 
invalid under state law after being challenged by chemical corporations). 
 210.  Id. at 19, 33. 
 211.  Id. at 3, 29. 
 212.  Id. at 29. 
 213.  Id. 
 214.  Id. at 30–32 (discussing various studies that have shown the negative effects that 
atrazine, chlorpyrifos, synthetic pyrethoids, neonicotinoids—all pesticides used in Hawaii—have 
on coral, ambhibians, birds, and bees). 
 215.  See Gibson, supra note 5, at 250–53 (noting that cross-pollination already poses 
significant threats to Hawaii’s non-GM coffee, macadamia, and papaya industries). 
 216.  Strauss, The Role of Courts, supra note 55, at 291. 
 217.  Hawaii Cty. Code § 14-92 (prohibiting cultivation and testing of GM taro); Hawaii Cty. 
Code § 14-93 (prohibiting cultivation and testing of GM coffee). 
 218.  See, e.g., Right to Know GMO Hawaii, RIGHT TO KNOW GMO, 
http://www.righttoknow-gmo.org/states/hawaii (last visited Sept. 16, 2015) (discussing various 
GMO labeling bills introduced in the state legislature that did not pass); Hosmer, supra note 6, 
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lack of industry responsiveness or meaningful state regulatory 
oversight, Kauai County, Hawaii County, and Maui County all 
attempted to respond at the local level in 2013-2014. 
A. Kauai’s Ordinance 960 
In November 2013, Kauai’s County Council passed Ordinance 
960.219  The Ordinance essentially sought to address three local 
concerns.220  First, the ordinance sought to require commercial 
agricultural producers to disclose large-scale pesticide applications 
and any GMOs grown on Kauai. 221  Second, the law sought to impose 
buffer zones between fields where pesticides were sprayed and 
sensitive areas such as child care centers, schools, residential care 
facilities, and hospitals.222  Third, the ordinance sought to require 
completion of an Environmental and Public Health Impact study 
(EPHIS) to address “key environmental and public health questions 
related to large scale commercial agricultural entities utilizing 
pesticides and genetically modified organisms.”223 
Ordinance 960 was subject to months of divisive public debate.224  
Those in support of the ordinance included many residents located 
close to the GMO fields, who were concerned about the health risks 
of pesticide drift and the poisoning of the local waterways.225  Those 
opposed to Ordinance 960 generally included commercial agricultural 
producers and their employees, as well as local businesses benefitting 
from their presence on the island.226  Ordinance 960 eventually passed 
by a 6-1 County Council vote and survived the mayor’s veto.227  Soon 
 
at 672 (“The frustration among Hawaiian GM crop opponents is palpable.”). 
 219.  Ordinance 960 was later codified as Kauai County Code (“KCC”) §§ 22–23 (2014).  
This article shall continue to refer to the ordinance in the text as Ordinance 960. 
 220.  KCC §§ 22–23. 
 221.  Id. at §§ 22–23.4(a)–(b). 
 222.  Id. at §§ 22–23.5. 
 223.  Id. at §§ 22–23.6. 
 224.  See Front Lines, supra note 199 (noting that earlier versions of the bill included 
tougher restrictions that had to be dropped “after lengthy public debate”). 
 225.  See Gibson, supra note 5, at 247–48 & n.264 (stating that many communities “located 
near seed crop operations and potential field trial sites” are speaking out due to “concerns 
about how the GE Industry and the use of GE crops” may harm the state’s “overall ecological 
biodiversity,” and the Department of Agriculture received a complaint about pesticides being 
sprayed next to an elementary school). 
 226.  See Front Lines, supra note 199 (“The biotech companies fought the bill tooth and nail, 
rallying their workers in protest and framing the bill as an attack on Kauai farmers and their 
jobs.”). 
 227.  Sophie Cocke, Kauai’s GMO and Pesticide Bill to Become Law After Veto Override, 
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thereafter, DuPont-Pioneer, Syngenta Seeds, Agrigenetics, and BASF 
Plant Sciences filed suit in federal court, arguing that Ordinance 960 
was pre-empted by existing state and federal laws.228 
On August 25, 2014, in the very first major decision to address 
local authority to regulate GMOs, the federal district court of Hawaii 
vacated Ordinance 960, finding the Ordinance pre-empted by state, 
but not federal, law.229  Specifically, the federal district court 
magistrate found that various state pesticide laws evidenced a 
legislative intent to pre-empt the entire field of pesticide regulation 
throughout the state, precluding Kauai County’s additional local 
notification and disclosure requirements.230  The district court also 
found that various state agricultural laws regulating plant pests and 
noxious weeds, and the Hawaii Constitution’s provision declaring the 
state’s responsibility to “promote [. . .] agriculture,” evidenced an 
intent to occupy the entire field of potential plant pest regulation, 
thereby precluding Kauai County from requiring GMO producers to 
provide annual reports on their GMO cultivation and testing 
activities to the County.231 
B. Hawaii County’s Ordinance 13-121 
Hawaii County also passed a local GMO ordinance in November 
of 2013.232  Rather than seeking to require pesticide and GMO 
notification and disclosures, Ordinance 13-121 sought to prohibit all 
open air cultivation, propagation, development, or testing of GM 
plants, other than GM papaya, in Hawaii County.233  Ordinance 13-
121 specifically exempted the cultivation and testing of GMOs in 
enclosed areas, such as greenhouses.234  The Ordinance’s main stated 
objectives were to prevent contamination of non-GM crops, plants, 
 
HONOLULU CIV. BEAT (Nov. 16, 2013),  http://www.civilbeat.com/2013/11/20426-kauais-gmo-
and-pesticide-bill-is-set-to-become-law-after-veto-override/. 
 228.  See Syngenta Seeds, Inc. v. Cty. of Kauai, No. 14-00014 BMK, 2014 WL 4216022, at *9 
(D. Haw. Aug. 25, 2014) (stating that the plaintiffs argued that Ordinance 960 was pre-empted 
by the Federal Insecticide Fungicide and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. § 136i-1(b) and a “federal 
coordinated framework” that comprehensively regulates GMOs). 
 229.  Id. at *1. 
 230.  Id. 
 231.  Id. at *8–9, *12. 
 232.  Hawaii County Ordinance 13-121, now codified as Hawaii County Code (“HCC”) §§ 
14-128–14-134 (2014). This article shall continue to reference this ordinance in the text as 
Ordinance 13-121. 
 233.  HCC § 14-130. 
 234.  Id. § 14-131. 
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and lands, and to promote “eco-friendly agricultural practices” on the 
island.235  Ordinance 13-121 also declared the County’s belief that: 
[P]olicies relating to agricultural practice are most appropriate to 
be determined by each county of the State of Hawaii, given the 
island-by-island variation in customary and generally accepted 
cultural practices and opportunities, the variation in topography 
and land ownership patterns, and in light of the natural geographic 
ocean barriers that allow for these distinctions.236 
The Hawaii County Council passed Ordinance 13-121 by a vote 
of 6-3.237  Soon thereafter, GMO producers brought suit in federal 
court, claiming that Ordinance 13-121 was pre-empted by both state 
and federal law.238 
In this second critical decision impacting the rights of local 
governments to regulate GMOs, the same federal district court 
magistrate once again struck down the local GMO Ordinance, this 
time finding that Ordinance 13-121 was not only pre-empted by 
existing Hawaii state agricultural laws, but also by the express pre-
emption provision of the federal Plant Protection Act.239  Specifically, 
the district court found that the same agricultural laws and state 
constitutional provision justifying pre-emption of Kauai’s Ordinance 
960 also justified state pre-emption of Hawaii County’s Ordinance 13-
121.240  In addition, the district court found that the Plant Protection 
Act’s express pre-emption provision precluded even wholly intrastate 
regulation of plants that would be regulated under the PPA because 
“all regulated articles under the PPA were ‘in or affect interstate 
commerce.’”241 
C. Maui’s Ballot Initiative 
The third attempt to regulate GMOs locally emerged from a 
successful voter initiative, placed on the November 4, 2014 ballot for 
 
 235.  Id. § 14-128(1)–(3). 
 236.  Id. § 14-128. 
 237.  Chemical Corporations Undermine the Will of the People of Hawaii County, CENTER 
FOR FOOD SAFETY (Nov. 26, 2014), http://www.centerforfoodsafety.org/press-releases/3628/ 
chemical-corporations-undermine-the-will-of-the-people-of-hawaii-county. 
 238.  See id. 
 239.  Haw. Floriculture & Nursery Ass’n v. Cty. of Haw., No. 14-00267 BMK, 2014 WL 
6685817, at *1 (D. Haw. Nov. 26, 2014), appeal docketed, No. 14-17538 (9th Cir. Dec. 26, 2014). 
 240.  See id. at *3 (stating that the ordinance is pre-empted under state law, following “the 
same arguments for state pre-emption that this Court faced in Syngenta Seeds, Inc. v. County of 
Kauai”). 
 241.  Id. at *8. 
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Maui County voters (the “Maui Initiative”).242  Unlike Hawaii 
County’s complete ban on open air GMO cultivation and testing, the 
Maui Initiative sought to impose a temporary moratorium on GMO 
production in Maui County until a comprehensive and satisfactory 
EPHIS could be completed.243  The Maui Initiative, which was 
opposed by Maui County officials but approved by Maui voters, was 
the very first voter initiative attempted in Maui County, despite the 
fact that the initiative power was granted back in 1983.244 
Despite its passage, on November 12, 2014, the drafters of the 
Maui Initiative filed suit in state court in order to force a recalcitrant 
Maui County to enforce the initiative.245  The next day, GMO 
producers Monsanto and Dow Chemical filed suit in federal court to 
prevent implementation of the initiative.246  The GMO producers once 
again claimed state and federal pre-emption.247  The district court 
promptly granted a preliminary injunction enjoining enforcement of 
the Maui Initiative.248 Soon thereafter, the GMO Producers and the 
County entered into a stipulation to continue the injunction until 
March 31, 2015.249 The injunction was later extended through the end 
of June, presumably due to two bills in the state legislature that might 
have affected the outcome of the lawsuit.250  In addition, the drafters 
of the Maui Initiative were granted the right to intervene as 
defendants in the federal lawsuit because County officials were 
clearly aligning with the GMO producers.251 
On June 30, 2015, in a third critical decision likely serving as the 
 
 242.  See Maui County Genetically Modified Organism Moratorium Initiative, 
BALLOTPEDIA.ORG (Nov. 2014), http://ballotpedia.org/Maui_County_Genetically_ 
Modified_Organism_Moratorium_Initiative_(November_2014),_full_text (last visited Oct. 29, 
2015) (stating that the initiative was approved) [hereinafter Maui Initiative]. Maui County 
includes the islands of Maui, Lanai, and Molokai. 
 243.  Id. 
 244.  Id. 
 245.  See Atay v. Cty. of Maui, No. 14-00582 SOM-BMK, 2015 WL 998792, at *3–9 (D. Haw. 
Mar. 5, 2015) (giving history of lawsuit). 
 246.  Id. 
 247.  Id. 
 248.  Id. 
 249.  Id. 
 250.  Robert Ito Farm, Inc. v. Cty. of Maui, No. 14-00511 SOM, 2015 WL 1279422, at *3 (D. 
Haw. Mar. 19, 2015). 
 251.  See Order (1) Granting Alika Atay, Lorrin Pang, Mark Sheehan, Bonnie Marsh, 
Lei’Ohu Ryder, and Shaka Movement’s Motion to Intervene and (2) Denying Moms On A 
Mission Hui, Moloka’i Mahi’ai, Gerry Ross, and Center for Food Safety’s Motion for Leave to 
Intervene, Robert Ito Farm, Inc. v. Cty. of Maui, No. 14-00511 BMK, 2014 WL 7148741 (D. 
Haw. Dec. 15, 2014). 
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final nail in the coffin for local GMO regulation in Hawaii, the same 
federal district court determined that the Maui Initiative was 
pre-empted by state and federal law.252  Specifically, the court agreed 
with the earlier Kauai County and Hawaii County determinations, 
namely that various Hawaii state agricultural laws and the state’s 
responsibility to promote agriculture indicated a legislative intent to 
preclude all local GMO regulation.253  Thus the court found that the 
proposed ordinance was both expressly and impliedly pre-empted by 
the PPA.254 
IV. WHY LOCAL DEMOCRACY SHOULD HAVE TRUMPED 
PRE-EMPTION CLAIMS IN HAWAII 
In its final Hawaii pre-emption decision, the district court in 
Robert Ito Farm asserted that its decision to invalidate a voter-
approved local GMO ordinance was not about determining whether 
“GE activities are good, bad, beneficial, or dangerous,” or about 
whether “citizens may participate in the democratic process.”255  
However, by finding that the local ordinances were pre-empted by 
state and federal law, the district court did make the radical decision 
to remove local citizen participation in the democratic process.  In 
addition, unless reversed, these pre-emption decisions will 
undoubtedly have far-reaching consequences for other local 
jurisdictions attempting to address GMO concerns through local 
regulation.256 Yet, neither Hawaii state law nor the express 
pre-emption provision of the federal Plant Protection Act justified 
the district court’s expansive findings of pre-emption, and all three 
decisions should be reversed. 
A. State Pre-Emption of the Local Ordinances 
In enacting their local GMO ordinances, all three counties relied 
upon their broad police powers granted to them under Hawaii 
Revised Statute § 46-1.5(13), which provides that: 
Each county shall have the power to enact ordinances deemed 
necessary to protect the health, life, and property, and to preserve 
 
 252.  Robert Ito Farm, Inc. v. Cty. of Maui, No. 14-00511 SOM/BMK, 2015 WL 4041480, at 
*1 (D. Haw. June 30, 2015). 
 253.  Id. at *16–20. 
 254.  Id. at *9–16. 
 255.  Id. at *1. 
 256.  See, e.g., Whitfield, Court Doubles Down, supra note 14 (predicting that “this 
interpretation of federal law will likely serve as a harbinger of future cases outside Hawaii”). 
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the order and security of the county and its inhabitants on any 
subject or matter not inconsistent with, or tending to defeat, the 
intent of any state statute where the state statute does not disclose 
an express or implied intent that the statute shall be exclusive or 
uniform throughout the State.257 
Accordingly, under the express terms of this statute, each county 
was fully empowered to use its police powers to regulate GMOs in 
order to protect against harms to health, life, and property, unless the 
local ordinance: (a) was expressly pre-empted by existing state law; 
(b) conflicted with existing state law; or (c) was impliedly pre-empted 
by existing state law.258  In the Hawaii pre-emption decisions, the 
district court properly noted the lack of any basis to find any express 
pre-emption of the local GMO ordinances, or any direct conflict with 
existing state statutes.259  Instead, in its three pre-emption decisions, 
the district court determined that the local GMO ordinances were 
impliedly pre-empted, based on the existence of “comprehensive 
regulatory schemes” in the same subject matter as the local 
ordinances that evidenced an intent to occupy the entire field of the 
subject matters regulated by the local ordinances. 260 This pre-emption 
theory is commonly referred to as field pre-emption.261 
Before proceeding to a substantive analysis of the court’s implied 
pre-emption determinations, it should be noted that using field-pre-
emption as a basis to pre-empt local ordinances is justifiably criticized 
by many as a “heavy-handed guessing game tilted in favor of the 
state.”262  It is a problematic theory on which to rest a finding of pre-
 
 257.  HAW. REV. STAT. § 46-1.5(13) (2015). Both Hawaii County and Kauai County also 
cited to Hawaii’s Constitutional Public Trust Doctrine, Hawaii Constitution, Article XI sec. 1, as 
further authority to regulate to protect and preserve Hawaii’s natural resources. Although the 
district court in its Hawaii pre-emption decisions erroneously refers to Hawaii as having a 
Dillon’s Rule relationship with its local counties, which significantly restricts local county 
regulatory authority, the Hawaii Supreme Court itself recognizes that Hawaii is a “home rule” 
state, which grants broad powers to its local counties to regulate locally. See Richardson v. City 
& Cty. of Honolulu, 868 P.2d 1193, 1213 (Haw. 1994) (acknowledging that Hawaii recognizes 
home rule, with certain stipulations). 
 258.  HAW. REV. STAT. § 46-1.5(13). 
 259.  See Syngenta Seeds, Inc. v. Cty. of Kauai, No. 14-00014 BMK, 2014 WL 4216022, at *5 
(D. Haw. Aug. 25, 2014) (stating that Ordinance 960 does not directly conflict with HRS § 
149A-31.2 or the Right to Farm Act). 
 260.  See Robert Ito Farm, Inc. v. Cty. of Maui, No. 14–00511 SOM/BMK, 14–00582, 2015 
WL 4041480, at *16–20 (D. Haw. June 30, 2015); Haw. Floriculture & Nursery Ass’n v. Cty. of 
Haw., No. 14-00267 BMK, 2014 WL 6685817, at *4 (D. Haw. Nov. 26, 2014); Syngenta Seeds, 
Inc. v. Cty. of Kauai, No. 14-00014 BMK, 2014 WL 4216022, at *5–6 (D. Haw. Aug. 25, 2014). 
 261.  See, e.g., Haw. Floriculture, 2014 WL 6685817, at *9. 
 262.  Vaubel, supra note 180, at 685. 
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emption for a number of reasons.263  First, state statutes and local 
ordinances often co-exist in the same or related subject matter areas 
without any findings of pre-emption.264  Consequently, cases where 
courts have drawn the line between proper co-existence and field pre-
emption are often contradictory and confusing, providing little 
precedential insight.265  Second, in enacting any particular law, a state 
legislature often “has no intent at all with respect to superseding 
municipal regulation.”266 Rather, the legislature most likely simply 
intended to regulate to solve “a particular problem.”267  Because the 
legislature only had the intent to address a particular problem, a 
court’s subsequent determination of a legislative intent to preclude 
future local regulation is often criticized as the substitution of 
“judicial judgment for lack of a legislative one” or, worse, “a 
reordering of government by judicial mandate.”268  Finally, field pre-
emption is a particularly harsh form of implied pre-emption because 
it not only precludes the local ordinance at issue, but it also serves to 
preclude all subsequent local regulation in that now-deemed fully 
occupied “field.”269  This pre-emption of an entire field occurs despite 
the fact that the state legislature, at the time of passing the statute 
that allegedly occupies that field, often “has no idea what those future 
local ordinances will look like.”270  Because of these inherent 
problems, and the impact field pre-emption has on local democracy, 
many scholars and critics contend that field pre-emption should be 
applied “cautiously,” and that any doubts as to legislative intent 
should be resolved in “favor of municipal power.”271 
Unfortunately, as discussed below, the district court did not elect 
to apply field pre-emption cautiously, nor resolve any doubts as to 
 
 263.  See, e.g., Richardson v. City & Cty. of Honolulu, 868 P.2d 1193, 1212–13 (Haw. 1994) 
(explaining that co-existence doesn’t necessarily equal pre-emption); Diller, supra note 176, at 
1116 (noting that courts have applied pre-emption tests inconsistently); Vaubel, supra note 180, 
at 684 (stating that states often enact laws without having any intention of “superseding 
municipal legislation”). 
 264.  See, e.g., Richardson, 868 P.2d, at 1212–13 (stating that the Trustees are mistaken to 
argue that the ordinance is in conflict with state law because the two are “coextensive”). 
 265.  See Diller, supra note 176, at 1116 (noting that courts have applied implied pre-
emption tests inconsistently, sometimes upholding local authority and sometimes constricting 
it). 
 266.  Vaubel, supra note 180, at 684. 
 267.  Id. 
 268.  See id. at 684–85. 
 269.  Diller, supra note 176, at 1155. 
 270.  Id. 
 271.  Vaubel, supra note 180, at 685–86. 
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legislative intent in favor of local power in any of the three pre-
emption decisions.  Instead, the district court in the Syngenta, Hawaii 
Floriculture, and Robert Ito Farm decisions elected to deny all three 
counties the authority to regulate GMOs locally by creatively finding 
both (1) a comprehensive regulatory scheme and (2) an implied 
legislative intent to preclude all local GMO regulation, where neither 
existed. 
1.  There is no comprehensive regulatory scheme fully 
embracing the same subject matter as the local GMO 
ordinances. 
Under Hawaii law, in order to find that a local ordinance is field 
pre-empted by existing state law, a court must find that: (1) the local 
ordinance attempts to regulate the same subject matter fully 
embraced by an existing comprehensive regulatory scheme; and (2) 
the comprehensive regulatory scheme evidences a clear legislative 
intent to be both uniform and exclusive throughout the state, leaving 
no room for local regulation.272 
In all three Hawaii pre-emption decisions, the district court 
determined that the local ordinances attempted to regulate in the 
same subject matter areas as existing state statutes.273 However, all 
three local ordinances attempted to regulate in a subject matter area 
for which there are currently no existing state statutes. Specifically, all 
three local ordinances concerned the regulation of genetically 
modified organisms cultivated and field-tested within their own local 
counties.274  For instance, Kauai County’s Ordinance 960 attempted to 
impose an annual reporting requirement on GMO producers that 
would have provided Kauai County citizens with basic, vital 
information relating to the GMO crops grown and the pesticides 
sprayed near local residences.275  Additionally, Hawaii County’s 
Ordinance 13-121 would have prohibited the open air testing and 
cultivation of most GMOs, in order to promote “eco-friendly” 
agriculture in Hawaii County.276  Finally, Maui County’s proposed 
 
 272.  Richardson v. City & Cty. of Honolulu, 868 P.2d 1193, 1209 (Haw. 1994). 
 273.  Robert Ito Farm, Inc. v. Cty. of Maui, Nos. 14–00511 SOM/BMK, 14–00582 
SOM/BMK, 2015 WL 4041480, at *16–20 (D. Haw. June 30, 2015); Haw. Floriculture & Nursery 
Ass’n v. Cty. of Haw., 2014 WL 6685817, at *4–6 (D. Haw. Nov. 26, 2014); Syngenta Seeds, Inc. 
v. Kauai, 2014 WL 4216022, at *8–9 (D. Haw. Aug. 25, 2014). 
 274.  See generally KCC §§ 22–23; HCC § 14-128; Maui Initiative, supra note 242. 
 275.  See generally KCC §§ 22–23. 
 276.  See generally HCC § 14-128. Hawaii County’s ban would have allowed closed facility 
cultivation and testing of GMOs and also allowed companies to apply for emergency 
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ordinance would have imposed a temporary ban on most GMOs 
cultivated and field-tested in Maui County until certain health and 
environmental impact studies were conducted and the County was 
assured that GMO cultivation was safe and beneficial for the County 
and its inhabitants.277  All three local ordinances presumably intended 
to capture all types of GMOs cultivated and tested in their counties, 
including biopharmaceutical crops, pesticide-incorporated-plants, and 
GM plants or crops that are not engineered with or considered “plant 
pests” and thus not regulated by the federal PPA.278 
In contrast, there are no Hawaii state laws that address the 
regulation of GMOs.279  In fact, there is only one law in Hawaii that 
even mentions them, and this law simply requires field-test applicants 
to submit a redacted copy of their federal permit application to the 
state.280  There are no state laws addressing biopharmaceutical GMOs, 
PIPs, unregulated or deregulated crops under the PPA, or any type of 
GM crop, plant, or organism whatsoever.281  There are also no state 
laws addressing public disclosure or annual reporting of GMOs, 
closed area cultivation of GMOs, or the need to conduct a state 
EPHIS prior to permitting the cultivation of GMOs.282   Because no 
state laws address the same subject matters as the local GMO 
ordinances, a proper field pre-emption analysis should have ended 
there.283 
Nevertheless, in all three Hawaii pre-emption decisions, the 
district court found the subject matter prong of the field pre-emption 
test satisfied by framing the subject matter of the local ordinances 
more expansively.284  Instead of addressing the regulation of GMOs, 
the district court determined that the subject matter of Ordinance 960 
 
exemptions to the ordinance’s prohibition on open air cultivation and testing. Id. 
 277.  Maui Initiative, supra note 242. 
 278.  See Montgomery, supra note 36, at 352 (GM crops engineered with genetic materials 
that are not considered to be plant pests themselves are not regulated under the PPA). 
 279.  See TAYLOR, TICK & SHERMAN, supra note 71, at 176; Gibson, supra note 5, at 245, 
257 (Hawaii has not enacted any legislation to regulate future GE release of biopharmaceuticals 
or open-air field testing). 
 280.  HAW. REV. STAT. § 321-11.6 (2003). 
 281.  Gibson, supra note 5, at 245–46, 257, 280–83. 
 282.  Reply Brief for Intervenor-Defendants-Appellants, supra note 208, at 26–28. 
 283.  See, e.g., Richardson v. City & Cty. of Honolulu, 868 P.2d 1193, 1210 (Haw. 1994) 
(finding that because a local ordinance had no counterparts in the various state statutes cited for 
a pre-emption challenge, the local ordinance could not be said to cover the “same subject matter 
embraced within” an existing statutory scheme). 
 284.  Reply Brief for Intervenor-Defendants-Appellants, supra note 208, at 26. 
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was more specifically about “identifying potentially harmful plants.”285  
Similarly, Ordinance 13-121’s subject matter was construed to be 
about protecting against “plants that may injure or harm agriculture, 
the environment, or public health.”286 
By generalizing the local ordinances’ subject matters to be about 
general plant pest regulation rather than about GMOs, the district 
court was then able to look to existing state agricultural laws to find a 
“comprehensive regulatory scheme.”287  Specifically, in all three pre-
emption decisions, the district court determined that the state’s 
existing noxious weed, plant quarantine, and seed certification laws, 
none of which regulate GMOs, established a comprehensive 
regulatory scheme meant to be uniform and exclusive as to all plant 
regulation in the state.288 
The district court’s finding, in all three pre-emption decisions, of 
a comprehensive regulatory scheme sufficient to preclude local GMO 
regulation based on general agricultural laws and authorizations is 
flawed for several reasons.  First, as indicated above, none of the 
agricultural laws cited by the court in any of the three pre-emption 
decisions address or contemplate the regulation of agricultural 
biotechnology. Thus, even if there is a regulatory scheme in Hawaii 
governing some aspects of plant regulation, the regulatory scheme 
can hardly be said to be comprehensive.  At the very least, there 
remains room for local regulation, particularly in an area so clearly 
overripe for substantive legislation.  Second, the laws of plant 
quarantine, noxious weed, and seed purity are separate laws enacted 
at different times by the legislature to address different agricultural 
issues, with many enacted before the advent of agricultural 
biotechnology.289  Although certainly a state could build upon existing 
statutes at different times and still create a “comprehensive” 
regulatory scheme, the loosely related laws governing plant 
 
 285.  See Syngenta Seeds, Inc. v. Cty. of Kauai, No. 14–00014 BMK 2014 WL 4216022, at * 9 
(D. Haw. Aug. 25, 2014) (noting that although the provisions relating to the identification of 
plants that may be harmful to the environment does not speak directly to reporting 
requirements for GMO crops, the statutory scheme is so framed to encapsulate the GMO 
notification provision in Ordinance 960 and is thus pre-empted by state law). 
 286.  Haw. Floriculture & Nursery Ass’n v. Cty. of Haw., No. 14–00267 BMK, 2014 WL 
6685817, at *5 (D. Haw. Nov. 26, 2014); see also Robert Ito Farm, Inc. v. Cty. of Maui, Nos. 14–
00511 SOM/BMK, 14–00582 SOM/BMK, 2015 WL 4041480, at *16–20 (D. Haw. June 30, 2015). 
 287.  Syngenta, 2014 WL 4216022, at *9; Haw. Floriculture, 2014 WL 6685817, at *5. 
 288.  Syngenta, 2014 WL 4216022, at *9; Haw. Floriculture, 2014 WL 6685817, at *5; Robert 
Ito Farm, Inc., 2015 WL 4041480, at *16–20. 
 289.  See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 150A-6 (1973) (prohibiting plant importation). 
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quarantine, noxious weed regulation, and seed certification instead 
suggests a factual scenario similar to Richardson v. City and County of 
Honolulu.290  In Richardson, the Hawaii Supreme Court specifically 
declined to find field pre-emption of a local ordinance that addressed 
condominium conversions based only on the existence of a series of 
loosely connected state laws enacted at different times and covering 
subject matter areas somewhat related to, but not directly touching 
upon, the area specifically covered by the challenged ordinance.291  In 
declining pre-emption, the Richardson court distinguished two earlier 
cases where implied pre-emption was found.292  In those earlier cases, 
the Richardson court indicated that field pre-emption was justified 
because the state laws: (1) evidenced a comprehensive “universe” of 
regulation that precisely touched upon the subject matter area of the 
local ordinance; and (2) expressly indicated an intent to apply to “all” 
aspects of the regulated subject matter(s).293 
In contrast to those earlier cases where state field pre-emption 
was proper, the noxious weed, plant pest, and seed certification laws 
of Hawaii do not create a comprehensive “universe” regulating all 
aspects of plant regulation, let alone the “galaxy” of GMOs.294  Nor is 
there any explicit language in any of the loosely connected statutes 
indicating a legislative intent to apply to “all” aspects of plant 
regulation, unlike the pre-emptive state statutes clearly distinguished 
in Richardson.295  While it is true that pre-emption may occur even 
where the state statute does not expressly pre-empt local authority to 
regulate in the precise area sought to be regulated, the state statutory 
scheme must nevertheless “fully embrace” that subject matter in 
order to justify field pre-emption under Hawaii’s comprehensive 
regulatory scheme test.296  Here, none of the various Hawaii state 
noxious weed, plant pest, and seed certification laws fully embrace 
 
 290.  Richardson v. City & Cty. of Honolulu, 868 P.2d 1193, 1208–09 (Haw. 1994). 
 291.  Id. 
 292.  Id. (distinguishing In re Application of Anamizu, 481 P.2d 116 (Haw. 1971), which 
addresses the statewide licensing of building contractors, and Citizens Util. Co. v. Cty. of Kauai, 
814 P.2d 398 (Haw. 1991), which addresses the state-wide regulation of public utilities). 
 293.  Id. 
 294.  See id. at 1209. 
 295.  Compare HAW. REV. STAT. § 150A-6, and HAW. REV. STAT. § 152-6, with HAW. REV. 
STAT. § 147-121 (lacking explicit language granting the state regulatory authority), and 
Richardson, 868 P.2d at 1208–09 (finding that explicit language indicated state authority to pre-
empt local law). 
 296.  Richardson, 868 P.2d at 1208–09. 
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the regulation of GMOs.297  Nor does repeating the artificial construct 
of an existing comprehensive regulatory scheme in all three pre-
emption decisions make it any more persuasive.  Indeed, the fact that 
seventeen states have already seen the need to expressly pre-empt 
local GMO regulation, rather than rely upon their similarly existing 
noxious weed and plant pest laws to impliedly do the job, further 
suggests that the district court’s findings of a “comprehensive 
regulatory scheme” sufficient to pre-empt all three local GMO 
ordinances are legally dubious.298  Because there is no comprehensive 
regulatory scheme governing all plant regulation, let alone all GMOs 
in Hawaii, the district court should have declined to find state pre-
emption of all three local ordinances. 
2.  There is no evidence of a legislative intent to preclude local 
GMO regulation. 
Furthermore, even if there were an existing comprehensive 
regulatory scheme governing certain aspects of plant regulation in 
Hawaii, a proper field pre-emption analysis requires that a legislative 
intent to fully occupy the area and preclude concurrent local 
regulation also be shown.299  In other words, the state regulatory 
scheme has to express or imply a legislative intent to not only be 
uniform, but also exclusive, leaving no room for concurrent local 
regulation.300 
In each Hawaii pre-emption decision, the district court 
determined that legislative intent to pre-empt all local regulation of 
GMOs was established through (1) existing agricultural laws, (2) the 
existence of a state-level agricultural advisory board, and (3) Article 
XI section 3 of the Hawaii Constitution, which provides in pertinent 
part that: 
The State shall conserve and protect agricultural lands, promote 
diversified agriculture, increase agricultural self-sufficiency and 
assure the availability of agriculturally suitable lands. The 
 
 297.  See Robert Ito Farm, Inc. v. Cty. of Maui, Nos. 14–00511 SOM/BMK, 14–00582 
SOM/BMK, 2015 WL 4041480, at *19 (D. Haw. June 30, 2015) (asserting that pre-emption was 
justified even if the various agricultural laws fail to explicitly mention GMOs because the scope 
of those state statutes and regulations “reach” GE organisms); but see Richardson, 868 P.2d at 
1209 (failing to analyze the extent of the “reach” or whether this constitutes a full embrace of 
the local regulation subject matter as required by Hawaii field preemption law). 
 298.  See supra pt. III.C. 
 299.  Id.; see also Pac. Int’l Servs. Corp. v. Hurip, 873 P.2d 88, 93–94 (Haw. 1994). 
 300.  Richardson, 868 P.2d at 1209. 
 
Barnett-Rose-Macro (Do Not Delete) 2/9/2016  4:55 PM 
Fall 2015] JUDICIALLY MODIFIED DEMOCRACY 113 
legislature shall provide standards and criteria to accomplish the 
foregoing.301 
Yet, there are a number of problems with the court’s reliance 
upon these materials to prove a legislative intent to preclude local 
GMO regulation.  First, the existing agricultural laws, most of which 
pre-date the existence of agricultural biotechnology, cannot honestly 
evidence a legislative intent to exclude all future local regulation of a 
technology the legislature did not even know would exist.  Second, 
the simple fact that a state-level agricultural advisory board exists to 
discuss and advise on agricultural issues does not indicate a legislative 
intent to exclude local counties from also participating in local 
agricultural decision-making.  Indeed, a number of federal advisory 
boards on biotechnology and agricultural biotechnology currently 
exist and/or have existed since the advent of this technology; this fact 
has never been used by any court to indicate an intent to preclude 
states from also regulating in these same areas within their own 
borders.302 
Finally, although Article XI section 3 of the Hawaii Constitution 
does indicate that the state has a general responsibility to preserve 
and promote agriculture, and this particular constitutional provision 
does not explicitly mention local counties, this silence on local 
participation hardly indicates any intent to preclude all local 
participation in local agricultural decision-making.  In fact, in 
Syngenta, the district court readily acknowledged that Hawaii’s 
Constitution also provides that the state has a responsibility in other 
subject matter areas of statewide interest, such as housing and public 
health, but that these constitutional expressions of general 
responsibility did not serve to remove local authority to also regulate 
in those areas.303  Nevertheless, without sufficiently explaining the 
reason for distinguishing agriculture from housing or public health, 
the district court concluded that this declaration of general 
responsibility, coupled with various agricultural laws, indicated a 
legislative intent to be exclusive in the particular area of plant 
regulation and/or agriculture.304 
 
 301.  Syngenta Seeds, Inc. v. Cty. of Kauai, No. 14–00014 BMK, 2014 WL 4216022, at *3 (D. 
Haw. Aug. 25, 2014); Haw. Floriculture & Nursery Ass’n v. Cty. of Haw., No. 14–00267 BMK, 
2014 WL 6685817, at *3–6 (D. Haw. Nov. 26, 2014). 
 302.  See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Advisory Committee on Biotechnology & 21st Century 
Agriculture, http://www.usda.gov/wps/portal/usda/usdahome?contentidonly=true&contentid= 
AC21Main.xml (last visited Nov. 1, 2015). 
 303.  Syngenta, 2014 WL 4216022, at *4. 
 304.  Id. at *8–10. 
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The district court’s determination of exclusivity, however, flies in 
the face of a number of other statutory and constitutional provisions 
that explicitly or implicitly recognize local county participation in 
regulating agriculture.305  Specifically, Hawaii Revised Statute section 
205-43 explicitly recognizes local county authority to participate in 
agricultural policy and land use decision-making, and Hawaii’s 
Constitution places an affirmative duty on local counties to preserve 
Hawaii’s natural resources – including the air, water, and land.306  It is 
difficult to imagine how a local county could fulfill its obligation to 
preserve Hawaii’s natural resources if it is not permitted to regulate 
on any aspect of agriculture. 
In addition to there being no evidence of any general legislative 
intent to preclude local counties from participating in local 
agricultural decision-making in any of the state agricultural laws, 
authorizations, or the general constitutional provision cited by the 
district court, extrinsic evidence actually supports a finding of no 
legislative intent to pre-empt local GMO regulation in particular.  
Specifically, prior to enacting Ordinance 13-121, Hawaii County had 
already enacted local ordinances precluding cultivation of GMO taro 
and GMO coffee.307  Presumably aware of these existing Hawaii 
County ordinances already regulating GMOs, the state legislature 
had never acted to pre-empt them.308  Although the court in Robert Ito 
Farm specifically rejected the argument that legislative silence 
following enactment of local GMO regulations supported a legislative 
intent not to preclude, it is difficult to understand how the district 
court ascribed weight to the legislative silence in Article XI section 3 
of the Constitution regarding local participation in agricultural 
decisions, yet determined that legislative silence following enactment 
of specific local GMO regulations did not support any inference of an 
 
 305.  Id. at *4-10. 
 306.  See HAW. REV. Stat. § 205-43 (“State and county agricultural policies, tax policies, land 
use plans, ordinances, and rules shall promote the long term viability of agricultural use of 
important agricultural lands.”); HAW. CONST. art. XI § 1 provides in pertinent part: 
For the benefit of present and future generations, the State and its political 
subdivisions shall conserve and protect Hawaii’s natural beauty and all natural 
resources, including land, water, air, minerals, and energy sources, and shall promote 
the development and utilization of these resources in a manner consistent with their 
conservation and in furtherance of the self-sufficiency of the State. All public natural 
resources are held in trust by the State for the benefit of the people. 
 307.  See Haw. Cty. Code § 14-92 (banning cultivation and testing of GMO taro); id. § 14-93 
(banning cultivation and testing of GMO coffee). 
 308.  See Robert Ito Farm, Inc. v. Cty. of Maui, Nos. 14–00511 SOM/BMK, 14–00582 
SOM/BMK, 2015 WL 4041480, at *55 (D. Haw. June 30, 2015). 
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intent not to preclude.309  Because the state legislature itself declined 
to expressly pre-empt prior local GMO regulation, the district court’s 
findings of intent to preclude suggests that the district court 
substituted its own “judicial judgment in the absence of a legislative 
one.”310 
Finally, by determining that the state’s quarantine, noxious weed, 
and seed certification laws, coupled with the state’s constitutional 
responsibility to “promote agriculture,” evidenced a legislative intent 
to occupy the entire field of plant regulation and agriculture, the 
district court created enormous uncertainty as to the legality of future 
local regulation that might touch on any aspect of plant regulation 
and/or agriculture.  “A judicial determination of ‘occupation of the 
field’ thereafter effectively sets a ceiling beyond which no local 
regulation can go.”311  If the district court indeed intended to pre-empt 
all local regulation of agriculture or plant regulation, its anti-localist 
decisions cannot be reconciled with existing laws explicitly 
recognizing local participation in agriculture, land-use, and 
conservation decision-making.312  Alternatively, if the court intended 
only to preclude local regulation of a favored industry, its pre-
emptive carve-out was done without any legitimate basis for field pre-
emption under existing Hawaii law.313 
 
 309.  Id. 
 310.  Vaubel, supra note 180, at 685. In addition to the pre-existing local GMO regulations 
in Hawaii County, the district court in Robert Ito Farm also ignored the fact that two GMO bills 
that would have precluded local regulation failed to pass in the state legislature just prior to the 
court’s final pre-emption decision, which also suggests that the legislature, as a whole, had no 
intent to preclude local regulation. Id. 
 311.  Diller, supra note 176, at 1155. 
 312.  See HAW. REV. STAT. § 205-43; HAW. CONST. art. XI, § 1. 
 313.  In the Syngenta decision, the federal district court also found that Kauai County’s 
pesticide provisions contained in Ordinance 960 were also preempted by the existence of 
various Hawaii state pesticide laws constituting a comprehensive regulatory scheme intending to 
be uniform and exclusive throughout the state.  See Syngenta Seeds, Inc. v. Cty. of Kauai, No. 
14–00014 BMK, 2014 WL 4216022, at *5–8 (Aug. 25, 2014). While there are some out-of-state 
cases that support the district court’s implied pre-emption decision on this issue, other courts 
have declined to find implied pre-emption of local pesticide regulation solely on the basis of 
existing state regulation.  See, e.g., Porter, supra note 4, at 14 (discussing People v. Cty. of 
Mendocino, 683 P.2d 1150 (1984) where the court declined preemption of local pesticide 
ordinance despite existence of state statute); but see Town of Wendell v. Atty Gen., 476 N.E.2d 
585 (Mass. 1985) (state statute pre-empted local pesticide ordinance).  Here, because Ordinance 
960 covered subject matter areas not covered by any Hawaii state pesticide law (e.g., the 
establishment of buffer zones between pesticide application areas and sensitive areas), the 
district court should have required the state of Hawaii to make any legislative intentions to pre-
empt local pesticide regulation explicit.  Nonetheless, this article does not address this aspect of 
the Syngenta decision because the author believes that Kauai County could have more properly 
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B. Federal PPA Pre-emption of Ordinance 13-121 and Maui County’s 
proposed GMO ordinance 
In the Hawaii Floriculture decision, the district court magistrate 
determined that Hawaii County’s Ordinance 13-121 was also 
expressly pre-empted, in part, by the federal Plant Protection Act.314  
Seven months later, in Robert Ito Farm, another judge within the 
same court determined that Maui County’s proposed ordinance was 
not only expressly pre-empted by the PPA, but it was also impliedly 
pre-empted.315  These federal pre-emption determinations may be 
even more concerning for future GMO regulation cases because they 
would also preclude states from regulating many GMOs wholly 
intrastate.316 
1. Express Federal Pre-Emption of Hawaii County’s Ordinance 
13-121 
In conducting any federal pre-emption analysis, a court must first 
begin with the presumption that the state or local regulation is valid.317 
In addition, where Congress enacts an express pre-emption provision, 
a court should construe the provision in a way that disfavors pre-
emption.  In fact, the court’s analysis must be limited to the pre-
emption provision, which defines the pre-emptive reach of the 
statute.318 
The express pre-emption provision of the Plant Protection Act 
provides that: 
Except as provided in paragraph (2), no State or political 
subdivisions of a State may regulate the movement in interstate 
commerce of any article, means of conveyance, plant, biological 
control organism, plant pest, noxious weed, or plant product in 
order to control a plant pest or noxious weed, eradicate a plant pest 
or noxious weed, or prevent the introduction or dissemination of a 
biological control organism, plant pest, or noxious weed, if the 
Secretary has issued a regulation or order to prevent the 
dissemination of the biological control organism, plant pest, or 
 
addressed the problems of pesticide applications associated with GMO operations by regulating 
or banning GMOs directly.  See, e.g., Robert Ito Farm, Inc., 2015 WL 4041480, at *21. 
 314.  Haw. Floriculture & Nursery Ass’n v. Cty. of Haw., No. 14–00267 BMK, 2014 WL 
6685817, at *7–9 (D. Haw. Nov. 26, 2014). 
 315.  Robert Ito Farm, Inc., 2015 WL 4041480, at *41. 
 316.  Id.; see also Whitfield, Court Doubles Down, supra note 14. 
 317.  Cippolone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992). 
 318.  Cippolone, 505 U.S. at 517. 
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noxious weed within the United States.319 
A plain reading of this express pre-emption provision suggests 
that two requisite elements must be present before federal pre-
emption will occur.  First, the state or political subdivision must seek 
to regulate a specified article’s movement “in interstate commerce” 
(in order to control, eradicate, or prevent the introduction or 
dissemination of the specified article).  Second, the Secretary of 
Agriculture must have “already issued a regulation or order” to 
prevent the dissemination of the same plant pest or noxious weed 
within the United States. 
As a local ordinance seeking only to prohibit the open air testing 
and cultivation of most GMOs in Hawaii County, Ordinance 13-121 
should have been beyond the reach of the PPA’s express pre-emption 
provision.  Certainly, Hawaii County was not attempting to regulate 
the movement of any federally regulated article “in interstate 
commerce” as defined by the PPA.320  Nonetheless, in Hawaii 
Floriculture, the district court ignored the plain language of the 
express pre-emption provision, as well as the PPA’s own definitions 
of “interstate” and interstate commerce,” which clearly refer to 
movement from one State to another, in order to preclude even 
wholly intrastate regulation.321  Indeed, because the PPA’s specific 
definition of “interstate commerce” contradicted the district court’s 
expansive pre-emption interpretation precluding intrastate 
regulation, the court referred to the general “Findings” section of the 
PPA for support.322  In the “Findings” section, the PPA indicates that 
all plant pests or noxious weeds regulated under the statute are “in or 
affect interstate commerce.”323  Using this general findings provision, 
 
 319.  7 U.S.C. § 7756(b)(1) (2006). 7 U.S.C. § 7756(b)(2) provides exceptions to the 
prohibition on state and local regulation of regulated articles in interstate commerce where the 
state or local regulations are consistent with the federal regulations or where the state or local 
government can show special need. 
 320.  The Plant Protection Act, 7 U.S.C. § 7702(6) (2006), provides that the term 
“interstate” means: “(A) from one State into or through any other State; or (B) within the 
District of Columbia, Guam, the Virgin Islands of the United States, or any other territory or 
possession of the United States.” Section 7702(7) provides that the term “interstate commerce” 
means trade, traffic, or other commerce: “(A) between a place in a State and a point in another 
State, or between points within the same State but through any place outside that State; or (B) 
within the District of Columbia, Guam, the Virgin Islands of the United States, or any other 
territory or possession of the United States.” 
 321.  Haw. Floriculture & Nursery Ass’n v. Cty. of Haw., No. 14-00267 BMK, 2014 WL 
6685817, at *7–9 (D. Haw. Nov. 26, 2014). 
 322.  Id. 
 323.  7 U.S.C. § 7701(9) (2006). 
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the district court reasoned that, although the express pre-emption 
provision referred only to a prohibition on state or local regulation of 
certain federally regulated articles “in” interstate commerce, because 
all plant pests regulated under the PPA also “affect” commerce, 
states and local governments would also be precluded from regulating 
PPA-regulated plant pests even where no actual interstate movement 
is involved. 324 
In addition, although many commentators have assumed that the 
second element of the express pre-emption test would require further 
action by the Secretary (or a proxy) to affirmatively regulate a 
particular article, such as the issuance of an APHIS permit for a 
particular GM crop or plant, the district court interpreted this second 
element of the express pre-emption provision expansively, finding 
that the promulgation of the general administrative regulations of the 
PPA itself was the only “issuance” needed to establish the second 
element of this test.325  
The district court’s finding that local regulation of GMOs is pre-
empted by an express provision meant, by its own terms, to prohibit 
the regulation of movement in interstate commerce should be 
rejected.  By ignoring precise definitions and relying instead on 
general statements within the “Findings” section of the PPA, the 
court disregarded its own obligation to narrowly construe express 
pre-emption provisions and to read them in a way that disfavors pre-
emption.326 
2. Federal Pre-Emption of Maui County’s Proposed GMO 
Ordinance 
In its final pre-emption decision, the district court in Robert Ito 
Farm stretched the boundaries of a legitimate federal pre-emption 
analysis even further than the court in Hawaii Floriculture, this time 
finding that Maui County’s proposed GMO ordinance was not only 
 
 324.  Id. 
 325.  Haw. Floriculture, 2014 WL 6685817, at *8–9 (finding that because the Secretary of 
Agriculture issued the regulations in 7 C.F.R § 340.0 (2015), which restrict the introduction of 
regulated articles generally, the Secretary had “issued a regulation preventing the dissemination 
of that plant pest or noxious weed,” which satisfied the second part of the PPA’s express pre-
emption test). 
 326.  See Altria Grp., Inc. v. Good, 555 U.S. 70, 77 (2008) (“When the text of a pre-emption 
clause is susceptible of more than one plausible reading, courts ordinarily accept the reading 
that disfavors pre-emption.”); Cippolone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 518 (1992) (“[W]e 
must construe [preemption] provisions in light of the presumption against the preemption of 
state police power regulations.”). 
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expressly pre-empted by the PPA’s express pre-emption provision, 
but also impliedly pre-empted because: (a) the proposed local 
ordinance prohibiting GMO cultivation conflicted with existing PPA 
regulations permitting the introduction of GMOs under certain 
conditions; and (b) the proposed local GMO ordinance “frustrated” 
the very purpose of the PPA to provide a national standard governing 
plant pest or noxious weed movement in interstate commerce.327 
There are a number of problems with the district court’s 
expansive federal pre-emption analysis.  First, as noted earlier, when 
conducting a federal pre-emption analysis involving an express pre-
emption provision, a court must first construe the express provision 
narrowly, in a way that disfavors pre-emption.328  In addition, where 
Congress enacts an express provision defining the reach of express 
pre-emption, matters beyond the reach of the express provision are 
not pre-empted.329  In Robert Ito Farm, the court not only read the 
express pre-emption provision so expansively so as to remove any 
meaning from the provision, it also impermissibly searched for 
additional bases on which to find pre-emption, rather than relying 
upon the limits contained within the express pre-emption provision 
itself.330 
The district court first determined that Maui County’s proposed 
local GMO ordinance was expressly pre-empted, not because of the 
actual language of the express pre-emption provision itself, which the 
court declined to parse, but because the local ordinance purportedly 
directly conflicted with federal agency (APHIS) regulations issued in 
association with the PPA, which “permit” introduction of certain 
GMOs into the environment (i.e., through the APHIS permitting or 
notification procedures), while the local ordinance attempted to ban 
them.331  In essence, the court’s determination means that once a 
GMO is “regulated” by APHIS and permitted to be introduced into 
the environment, any state or local regulation that “prohibits” these 
same GMOs, even if the prohibition is wholly intrastate (and even if 
the local or state regulation is not intended to protect against 
potential plant pest risk issues but to address other state or local 
issues or concerns), the state or local regulation directly “conflicts” 
 
 327.  Robert Ito Farm, Inc. v. Cty. of Maui, Nos. 14–00511 SOM/BMK, 14–00582 
SOM/BMK , 2015 WL 4041480, at *9–15 (D. Haw. June 30, 2015). 
 328.  Cippolone, 505 U.S. at 518. 
 329.  Id. at 517. 
 330.  Robert Ito Farm, Inc., 2015 WL 4041480, at *15. 
 331.  Id. at *9–14. 
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with the PPA and is thus pre-empted by federal law.332 
This expansive interpretation of federal express pre-emption 
should be rejected for several reasons.  First, the court seemed to 
outright ignore the language of the express pre-emption provision 
itself, which precludes only state or local regulation that involves the 
attempted regulation of “movement in interstate commerce” of PPA-
regulated articles.333  By looking only to APHIS-promulgated 
regulations for express pre-emption support, the court effectively 
removed the very meaning of the PPA’s express pre-emption 
provision, since the APHIS regulations are not concerned with 
defining the permissible limits of state or local authority to regulate 
PPA-regulated articles, while the express pre-emption provision was 
included by Congress for that very purpose.334  Indeed, by ignoring the 
express pre-emption provision and using APHIS regulations to justify 
a conflict pre-emption determination, the court in effect gives GMO 
growers who receive a federal APHIS permit — or who simply notify 
APHIS of an intent to grow GMOs — a blanket “right to grow” their 
GMO crops wherever they choose, without any state or local 
interference, since under the court’s interpretation, the state or local 
government cannot prohibit what APHIS permits (or even 
acknowledges).335  However, if Congress intended to remove all state 
or local authority to regulate GMOs regulated by the PPA, it 
certainly could have stated its intention to pre-empt all intrastate 
regulation much more clearly.  The fact that the express pre-emption 
provision specifically prohibits state and local regulation of 
“movement in interstate commerce” suggests that Congress only 
meant to preclude states and local governments from interfering with 
the movement of regulated articles in interstate commerce – i.e., from 
one state to another.336  Obviously, GMOs that are grown in the local 
counties of Hawaii are not “in” interstate commerce, as clearly 
defined by the PPA.337  The mere fact that certain GMOs may at some 
point move in interstate commerce does not somehow transform 
wholly local regulation into a regulation on movement “in interstate 
 
 332.  Id. 
 333.  7 U.S.C. § 7756(b)(1) (2006). 
 334.  Id.; see Robert Ito Farm, Inc., 2015 WL 4041480, at *11 (“If the Ordinance conflicts 
with 7 C.F.R. § 340.0, then the Ordinance’s conflicting provisions are pre-empted pursuant to 7 
U.S.C. § 7756(b).”). 
 335.  See id. (“If the Ordinance conflicts with 7 C.F.R. § 340.0, then the Ordinance’s 
conflicting provisions are pre-empted pursuant to 7 U.S.C. § 7756(b).”). 
 336.  7 U.S.C. § 7756(b)(1). 
 337.  7 U.S.C. § 7702(6)–(7) (2006). 
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commerce.”338 
The district court’s finding of express pre-emption should be 
reversed because (1) the express pre-emption provision of the PPA 
should be interpreted plainly by its own terms; (2) the provision 
clearly delineates what state and local governments can and cannot 
regulate with respect to PPA-regulated articles; and (3) the proposed 
Maui County local GMO ordinance did not attempt to exceed the 
permissible scope of intrastate regulation. 
In addition, although the court indicates that it had no need to 
proceed to an implied pre-emption analysis, it elected to do so 
anyway, despite its general obligation not to proceed beyond the 
confines of the express pre-emption provision itself.339  Specifically, in 
Robert Ito Farm, the court declared that even if there were no express 
pre-emption of Maui County’s proposed local ordinance, the local 
ordinance would be impliedly pre-empted because it “frustrates the 
purpose” of the PPA, which the court determined to be about setting 
“a national standard governing the movement of plant pests and 
noxious weeds in interstate commerce based on sound science.”340  
Yet, in actuality, it appears that a local regulation that is also 
concerned, in part, with prohibiting potential plant pests would be 
complementary to the PPA, rather than frustrating to its purpose.  In 
addition, the claim that the PPA’s primary purpose is to set a national 
standard based on “sound science” is unpersuasive, given that 
determinations of plant pest risks under APHIS’ regulatory 
procedures are not based on sound science but rather on self-
interested determinations by the regulated GMO entities 
themselves.341  Most significantly, even if the PPA’s purpose was to set 
a national standard “governing the movement of plant pests and 
weeds in interstate commerce,” it is difficult to understand how the 
local regulation of GMOs in Maui County frustrates this purpose.  
For all of these reasons, the district court’s implied pre-emption 
analysis should also be rejected. 
The Hawaii pre-emption decisions are currently on appeal to the 
Ninth Circuit.342  If not reversed, these three pre-emption decisions 
 
 338.  7 U.S.C. § 7756(b)(1). 
 339.  Cippolone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 517 (1992) (“Congress’ enactment of a 
provision defining the pre-emptive reach of a statute implies that matters beyond that reach are 
not pre-empted.”).  
 340.  Robert Ito Farm, Inc., 2015 WL 4041480, at *15. 
 341.  See supra pt. II.A. 
 342.  See, e.g., Brief for Defendant-Appellant, Syngenta Seeds, Inc. v. Cty of Kauai, No. 14-
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are likely to have a significant adverse impact on all future local and 
state GMO regulation.  Not surprisingly, the removal of all local 
county authority to regulate GMOs by a single district court has 
prompted many Hawaii citizens and GMO activists to take their 
battle to the state legislature.343  At the same time, despite pre-
emption victories at the district court level, the GMO industry 
continues to lobby the state legislature to expressly pre-empt local 
authority to regulate GMOs.344  At the time of this article’s 
completion, the Hawaii legislature had not yet enacted any express 
pre-emption law, and two bills introduced in the 2014 legislative 
session that would have pre-empted GMO local regulation failed to 
pass.345  Still, the Hawaii governor’s assertion that GMO regulation 
should be conducted at the state level and significant industry 
influence in the legislature both suggest that Hawaii may soon join 
the express-pre-emption states.346  For the reasons discussed below, 
however, Hawaii should decline to exercise its denial authority, unless 
it is prepared to enact substantive GMO legislation of its own. 
V. WHY LOCAL GOVERNMENTS SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO 
REGULATE GMOS ABSENT SUFFICIENT 
STATE OR FEDERAL OVERSIGHT 
Regardless of the ultimate outcome in the Hawaii pre-emption 
decisions, the battle over local GMO regulation throughout the 
United States is far from over.  Citizens concerned with under-
regulation of GMOs will continue to seek ways to regulate or even 
ban them, and the agricultural biotech industry will continue to lobby 
state legislatures to expressly preclude local regulation, or challenge 
any exercise of local regulatory authority through the courts. 
However, courts should resist finding an implied state intent to 
pre-empt local authority absent either: (a) a legitimate state 
regulatory scheme explicitly regulating GMOs; or (b) an express pre-
emption provision by the state legislature.  First, as should be evident 
by the Hawaii pre-emption decisions, a judicial determination of field 
pre-emption of local GMO ordinances smacks of judicial 
overreaching when there are no comprehensive state schemes 
 
16833, 2014 WL 7498032 (9th Cir.  Dec. 31, 2014). 
 343.  See Ludwig, Headed to Honolulu, supra note 206. 
 344.  Id. 
 345.  See Robert Ito Farm, Inc. v. Cty. of Maui, No. 14-00511 SOM/BMK, 2015 WL 1279422, 
at *2 (D. Haw. Mar. 19, 2015). 
 346.  Front Lines, supra note 199. 
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governing GMOs.  If legislative intent is the true cornerstone of an 
implied pre-emption analysis, general agricultural laws governing 
plant quarantines and noxious weeds simply do not evidence a 
legislative intent to preclude all future local GMO regulation.347  
These state laws often pre-date biotechnology and were likely 
enacted to solve a particular problem unrelated to GMOs as they do 
not address many of the public health, environmental, and economic 
concerns specific to GMOs. 
Second, state legislatures are perfectly capable of expressly 
denying their political subdivisions the authority to regulate in 
specified areas.  Courts should therefore require that any intent to 
preclude local GMO regulation be explicit.  Absent an express intent 
to preclude, courts should not be in the business of denying local 
authority and choice to regulate GMOs.  To do so is an unwarranted 
judicial intrusion into the very crux of local “home rule” authority, 
and particularly the authority of a local government to exercise its 
police powers to protect its citizens from harm to life, health, and 
property.348 
State legislatures should also exercise extreme caution before 
denying local governments the authority to regulate, particularly in 
health and safety areas traditionally reserved to them.349  Indeed, the 
growing trend towards express state pre-emption of issues once 
readily acknowledged as areas of local concern has already had a 
devastating impact on both local and direct democracy and on state-
local relations.350  Express state pre-emption has now prevented many 
local governments, as well as local communities through the direct 
democracy (i.e., direct voter participation) process, from participating 
in decisions that unquestionably affect their health, safety, and 
welfare.351  For example, a number of states have now expressly 
 
 347.  See supra pt. IV; see generally Diller, supra note 176, at 1150 (calling field pre-emption 
“aggressively anti-localist”). 
 348.  See HAW. REV. STAT. § 46-1.5 (2015); see also Ludwig, Headed to Honolulu, supra 
note 206 (noting a state legislator’s attempt to strike the words “health” and “life” from the 
counties’ current regulatory authority). 
 349.  See Hillsborough Cty. v. Automated Med. Labs, Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 708 (1985) (“The 
regulation of health and safety matters is primarily and historically a matter of local concern.”). 
 350.  See generally Porter, supra note 4. Direct democracy is the process whereby people 
participate directly in making binding decisions on public policy by voting on proposed 
measures, such as through the ballot initiative, referendum, or recall process. See generally 
HENRY S. NOYES, THE LAW OF DIRECT DEMOCRACY 3 (2014). 
 351.  See, e.g., Porter, supra note 4, at 13 (noting that 43 states have some form of state law 
that pre-empts local governments’ ability to regulate pesticides); Rita Barnett-Rose, 
Compulsory Water Fluoridation: Justifiable Public Health Benefit or Human Experimental 
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denied local and direct public participation on important public 
health and environmental issues such as aerial pesticide spraying, 
compulsory water fluoridation, permissible smoking area bans, and 
local hazardous waste cleanups.352  Many of these issues are of 
significant concern to local communities, who often want their local 
governments to impose more stringent standards on the regulated 
entities than the state or federal governments require in their higher-
level regulatory schemes.353 
While denial of local authority through express pre-emption may 
be justifiable to avoid duplication or conflict with an existing state 
regulatory scheme, the denial of local authority is not justifiable 
where there is no comprehensive state regulatory scheme occupying 
the entire field of the subject matter sought to be regulated locally.  In 
those cases, denial authority is often exercised as a result of successful 
lobbying by businesses and industries seeking to escape the more 
stringent oversight of local regulation.354 The unfortunate result of 
express pre-emption solely at the behest of industry may be the 
creation of “regulatory vacuums” where regulatory oversight may in 
fact be most warranted.355 
Thanks to three decades of under-regulation and explosive 
growth, the agricultural biotech industry has been instrumental in 
getting various states to pre-empt local GMO regulation.356  Pre-
emption is typically achieved through a state’s regulation of “seed.”357  
Specifically, by amending its seed law and declaring the regulation of 
“seed” to be an issue of state-wide concern, a state effectively 
removes all authority to regulate GMOs at the local level, without the 
state having to enact any substantive GMO legislation of its own.358 
 
Research Without Informed Consent?, 39 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 201, 206–07 
(2014) (noting that legislatures and executive branches have maneuvered around public 
resistance to fluoridation programs by mandating fluoridation by executive fiat or by enacting 
state-wide compulsory water fluoridation schemes that remove any ability to put the issue to a 
local public vote). 
 352.  Id. 
 353.  Id. 
 354.  Diller, supra note 176, at 1139–40 (“[E]xamples abound of state legislatures overriding 
[local] ordinances at the behest of the business community.”); Porter, supra note 4, at 13–15. 
 355.  Kromm, supra note 176, at 257. 
 356.  Porter, supra note 4, at 15; Bailey, supra note 188. 
 357.  Porter, supra note 4, at 15; Bailey, supra note 188 (“The virtually identical language 
used in different states’ pre-emption bills illustrates a systematic and ordered approach to 
stifling community decision-making by passing laws that prevent local governments [from] 
regulating genetically modified seeds.”). 
 358.  Porter, supra note 4, at 15; Bailey, supra note 188 (“[S]tate preemption laws can do 
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Yet, there are many reasons why states should decline to pre-
empt local GMO regulation in this way.  First, allowing local 
governments to experiment with local GMO policies may help to 
generate innovative solutions that balance citizen and industry 
interests and that may ultimately find application on a wider scale.  
Second, because many of the actual adverse impacts of GMOs are 
first felt locally, allowing local governments (and local communities) 
to participate in finding solutions will enhance local democracy, 
community diversity, and industry responsiveness to legitimate local 
concerns. 
A. Permitting Local GMO Regulation Fosters Policy Innovation 
Local government scholars have noted that local governments 
are often at the forefront of innovative policies that have gone on to 
spur others to also take action.359  A regulation instituted by one local 
government may end up proving to be so successful that it may end 
up “percolating ‘out’ to other cities and ‘up’ to the state level.”360  
Some of the most innovative policies now implemented on a 
statewide or even national level were, in fact, the result of local 
government innovation.361  State-wide smoking bans in restaurants, 
and domestic partnership benefit laws, for example, were first birthed 
through local innovation.362  Of course, the converse could also be 
true: an experimental local regulation or policy could prove to be 
unworkable upon implementation.  Local experimentation would 
allow it to be dismantled far more easily than after a state-wide roll 
out.  Accordingly, local governments might best be seen as “policy 
incubators,” and given room to experiment with “new and interesting 
policies that, for whatever reason, the state and federal governments 
may be unprepared or politically unable to adopt.”363  Indeed, by 
allowing local experimentation, local governments may prove the 
value of a particular policy, which may in turn compel state 
 
two things. They can overturn the will of the people in the event an initiative has passed, and 
they can prevent the introduction of laws on the same subject from being introduced in the 
future.”). 
 359.  See, e.g., Diller, supra note 176, at 1118–19. 
 360.  Id. 
 361.  Id. 
 362.  Id. 
 363.  Id. at 1129–30 (“Cities often lead in setting policy that Congressmen and state 
legislators have failed to address, whether due to greater policy risk aversion or fear of 
offending entrenched and well-financed interest groups that wield significant interest.”). 
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legislatures (or even Congress) to act as well.364 
Despite GMO proponents’ claims to the contrary, evidence is 
mounting that GMOs present significant risks to public health, the 
environment, and non-GM crops.365 Because federal agencies and 
state legislatures as a whole remain unwilling to address these 
significant risks and realities, allowing local governments the 
authority to enact local GMO regulations may result in innovative 
solutions to GMO concerns.  For example, a local regulation that 
requires a GMO producer to disclose reasonable information about 
its GMO activities to local citizens or to establish reasonable buffer 
zones between its activities and residential areas may prove to 
assuage many local citizen concerns while also allowing the industry 
to remain operational.  It might also reduce reported incidents of 
RUP illnesses or environmental harms.  Similarly, a local regulation 
requiring GMO closed container cultivation that proves to protect 
against non-GM crop contamination might spur the GMO industry to 
come up with larger-scale containment facilities.  This could in turn 
address nation-wide concerns about GMO contamination.366  
Moreover, GMO solutions that are successful in one local community 
may also percolate out to other cities, towns, and counties.  If that 
were to happen, state legislatures or even Congress may recognize the 
value of these local solutions and be persuaded to enact solutions on a 
wider scale.  Until that time, however, local GMO innovation and 
regulation should be encouraged, not denied. 
B. Permitting Local Regulation of GMOs Fosters Local Democracy, 
Diversity, and Industry Responsiveness to Local Concerns 
Beyond the benefits of policy innovation, allowing local 
governments to regulate on issues of significant local concern 
promotes local democracy, community diversity, and industry 
responsiveness to community needs. 
First, legitimate democracy requires that those bound by a 
governmental action have the opportunity to participate in or 
influence the decision making process.367  Thus, “[t]here should be a 
 
 364.  Id. 
 365.  See supra pt. I and III; see also Strauss, Defying Nature, supra note 20, at 18 (“Many of 
these risks have already become a reality both in initial studies and alarming incidents.”). 
 366.  See supra pt. I and III. 
 367.  See Richard Briffault, Home Rule for the Twenty-First Century, 36 URB. LAW 253, 260–
61 (2004) (“Democracy requires that those bound by a local government action have the 
opportunity to participate in the local decision making process.”). 
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broad presumption of local power to act on matters that affect the 
locality or the people within it.” 368 Allowing local governments the 
ability to regulate on issues of local concern fosters democracy 
because it allows local citizens the ability to participate in important 
policy decisions in ways unavailable to them at the state or national 
level.369  Citizens have far more access to their local representatives 
than their state or national counterparts, which enables their 
participation in government decision-making.370  In addition, citizens 
are able to mobilize at the local level more easily and more cost 
effectively than at state or national levels, where they may be easily 
outspent and outmanned by industry lobbyists.371 Local 
representatives are also likely to be less influenced by the moneyed 
special interests that often dominate state and national politics, and 
thus are likely to be more responsive to citizen concerns.372 
Second, permitting local government regulation allows 
communities to adopt policies that reflect their particular values, 
needs, and concerns.373  While a statewide regulation in areas of 
traditionally local concern might be well-received in some areas, it 
might be completely contrary to local preferences or needs in others. 
Unless justified by a compelling statewide need for uniformity, states 
should not “jeopardize state-local relations” by denying local 
authority to regulate in areas of local concern simply for legislative 
convenience.374  Giving local governments the authority to regulate on 
issues of local concern, as long as those regulations do not harm 
others outside of the local community, “increases the likelihood that 
people will be happy with their government.”375 
As evidenced by the ongoing battle in Hawaii and in other 
localities throughout the United States, the cultivation and testing of 
GMOs is an issue of immense local concern, with significant impact 
on local communities.376  Removing local autonomy to determine 
whether, and on what terms, to permit GMO cultivation and testing 
 
 368.  Id. at 264. 
 369.  Diller, supra note 176, at 1128. 
 370.  Briffault, supra note 367, at 258. 
 371.  Diller, supra note 176, at 1120; Briffault, supra note 367, at 258. 
 372.  Diller, supra note 176, at 1120. 
 373.  Briffault, supra note 367, at 264 (“The essence of home rule is to enable people of 
different communities to find different answers to the same questions, to tailor government  
action to local needs, circumstances, and preferences.”). 
 374.  Vaubel, supra note 180, at 656. 
 375.  Briffault, supra note 367, at 259. 
 376.  See supra pt. III. 
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in that locality means that those most impacted by the GMO industry 
and its under-regulation are least able to participate in the decision-
making process.377  Without the ability to participate in the decision-
making process, local citizens become little more than “the guinea 
pigs in a grand experiment without their knowledge and consent.”378 
Allowing local participation in GMO decision-making increases both 
the effectiveness, and the legitimacy, of governmental action.379 
Finally, although businesses and industry are often the first to 
challenge more stringent local regulation, local oversight is likely to 
result in a more responsive and responsible industry.  This in turn 
could reduce much of the resentment felt by local communities 
adversely affected by under-regulated or unregulated industry 
operations.  Not surprisingly, due to unprecedented under-regulation 
of GM foods and crops and the GMO industry’s refusal to either label 
their GM products or provide local communities with important 
information concerning their GMO operations, the GMO industry is 
perceived by many to be an industry that is wholly unconcerned with, 
and unaccountable to, local communities or consumers.380  There is a 
risk that U.S. citizens may eventually reject agricultural 
biotechnology altogether if this impression of industry arrogance and 
single-minded focus on profits continues to spread among educated 
citizens.381  Local GMO regulations that place reasonable restrictions 
on the industry and that require industry responsiveness to 
community health, environmental, and economic concerns would go a 
long way towards citizen-industry reconciliation.382 It might also lead 
 
 377.  Vaubel, supra note 180, at 652 (“Ultimately, authorizing legislative definition of 
municipal power fails to recognize the importance of municipal power as the vehicle for 
municipal citizens to participate in decisionmaking.”). 
 378.  Strauss, Defying Nature, supra note 20, at 19; see also Bailey, supra note 188 (“The 
legislators introducing these bills concerning [GMO] seeds are not acting on behalf of the 
people; they are acting despite the will of the people.”). 
 379.  Vaubel, supra note 180, at 652. 
 380.  See, e.g., Strauss, Defying Nature, supra note 20, at 29 (“In the United States, the 
public outrage at being denied a choice [about GMO consumption] has generated a grassroots 
political effort to raise consciousness of consumers and alert them as to what they are not being 
told, while advocating labeling.”); McGarity, supra note 17, at 473 (“The U.S. biotechnology 
industry entered the GM foods debate with an arrogance reminiscent of the nuclear power 
industry in the 1950s.”). 
 381.  See, e.g., Strauss, Defying Nature, supra note 20, at 29 (noting that European 
opposition to GMOs was based on ethical grounds as a reaction to being denied a choice when 
GMO and non-GMO varieties could not be differentiated); Hosmer, supra note 5, at 671–72 
(“Protests such as Occupy Monsanto have increased in regularity and size and activists have 
increased coordination with other state and nationwide initiatives.”). 
 382.  See McGarity, supra note 17, at 473 (“The agricultural biotechnology industry will 
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to a more ethically, scientifically, and environmentally responsible 
industry. 
CONCLUSION 
The cultivation, field testing, and release of GMOs into the 
environment and food supply continues to generate significant 
concern throughout the United States.383  While many other nations 
have elected to proceed far more cautiously in incorporating 
agricultural biotechnology into their agricultural operations, the U.S. 
government’s policies remain staunchly supportive of the industry 
and its various products.384  Critics believe that this myopic support 
has resulted in a seriously deficient federal regulatory framework that 
fails to protect human health or the environment.385  Because states 
have largely failed to fill the regulatory gaps left by the federal 
framework, a small but growing number of local governments have 
attempted to regulate GMOs locally.386  However, local regulation 
faces significant opposition from the GMO industry, which continues 
to challenge local democracy through the courts and through 
lobbying efforts aimed at persuading state legislatures to expressly 
deny local authority.387  While a number of states have capitulated to 
industry by expressly pre-empting local GMO regulation, the recent 
federal district court decisions in Hawaii were the very first to 
invalidate local GMO ordinances on the basis of implied pre-
emption.388 These implied pre-emption decisions should be reversed.  
 
succeed only if the public is convinced that the industry and the regulatory agencies that 
legislatures have created to protect consumers are trustworthy.”). 
 383.  See McGuire Woods, State of the GMO Union: Courts Address Localism, Federalism 
Amid New Legislation, MCGUIRE WOODS (Jan. 23, 2015), https://www.mcguirewoods.com/ 
Client-Resources/Alerts/2015/1/State-of-the-GMO-Union.aspx (last visited Nov. 1, 2015) 
(discussing current legislation and lawsuits throughout the U.S. on GMO issues). 
 384.  See Strauss, Defying Nature, supra note 20, at 29 (“[T]he European regulatory 
approach arose in part as a solution to [the] ethical and practical duty to inform.”). 
 385.  Id. at 30–31. 
 386.  See State of the GMO Union, supra note 383. 
 387.  See Robert Ito Farm, Inc. v. Cty. of Maui, Nos. 14–00511 SOM/BMK, 14–00582 
SOM/BMK, 2015 WL 4041480, at *1 (D. Haw. June 30, 2015) (“Robert Ito Farm, Inc., Hawaii 
Farm Bureau Federation, Maui County, Molokai Chamber of Commerce, Monsanto Company, 
Agrigenetics Inc., Concerned Citizens of Molokai and Maui, Friendly Isle Auto Parts & 
Supplies, Inc., New Horizon Enterprises, Inc., and Hikiola Cooperative, opponents of the 
initiative, sued the County of Maui by filing the Robert Ito Farm action in this court.”); State of 
the GMO Union, supra note 383 (“[A] mandatory-labeling measure on the ballot in Washington 
failed after a sustained and expensive campaign by opponents.”). 
 388.  See State of the GMO Union, supra note 383 (“[T]wo court decisions since August 2014 
have delighted opponents of GMO regulation and previewed the challenges—pre-emption in 
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Because the vast majority of states do not have comprehensive 
regulatory schemes governing GMOs, implied field pre-emption is a 
particularly illegitimate ground on which to deny local authority to 
regulate GMOs.  Courts should instead require that state legislatures 
expressly pre-empt local GMO regulation if the legislature wishes to 
do so, and should refuse to engage in a legally dubious search for 
legislative intent among general agricultural laws. 
Moreover, unless states are prepared to enact substantive GMO 
legislation of their own, state legislatures should also decline to pre-
empt local authority to regulate GMOs.  Allowing local regulation of 
GMOs may turn out to be exactly what is needed to strike a balance 
between citizen concerns and industry viability.  In addition, by 
respecting local authority to regulate in an area clearly affecting local 
health, life, and property, states would not risk jeopardizing state-
local relationships simply for legislative convenience or capitulation 
to a powerful industry.  Permitting local governments and local 
citizens to participate in GMO decision-making enables legitimate 
democracy.  It may also result in creating an industry far more 
responsive to the local communities in which the industry operates. 
 
 
particular—likely to be faced by labeling laws.”). 
